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THE PROBATIVE SYNERGY OF PLUS FACTORS IN 
PRICE-FIXING LITIGATION 
Christopher R. Leslie 
ABSTRACT—Private plaintiffs alleging that defendants conspired to fix 
prices in violation of antitrust law must usually prove their claims through 
circumstantial evidence, generally in the form of “plus factors”—evidence 
indicating that the defendants’ parallel conduct was caused by collusion, not 
by independent decision-making. Supreme Court precedent requires fact 
finders to examine antitrust plaintiffs’ evidence holistically. With increasing 
frequency, however, federal courts in price-fixing cases improperly isolate 
each piece of circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff and then 
deprive it of all probative value because that single piece of evidence is 
insufficient, standing alone, to prove a price-fixing conspiracy. As a result, 
federal courts routinely grant summary judgment to price-fixing defendants 
even when plaintiffs have proffered more than enough evidence to prove 
their case.  
 This Article develops a typology of plus factors. Using antitrust case 
law, empirical research, and economic theory, this Article categorizes dozens 
of plus factors and explains the probative value of individual plus factors, as 
well as their interrelationships with each other. Plus factors may fall into one 
of several categories, such as Cartel Susceptibility, Cartel Formation, Cartel 
Management, Cartel Enforcement, and Cartel Markers. The Article then 
introduces and develops the concept of probative synergy, which describes 
how the probative value of each individual plus factor increases as additional 
plus factors are introduced into the equation.  
 Despite the longstanding rule that courts should not compartmentalize 
an antitrust plaintiff’s evidence of conspiracy, courts often inappropriately 
isolate individual plus factors and incorrectly suggest that if a plus factor 
does not by itself prove collusion, then it is not a plus factor at all. This 
approach miscomprehends the entire structure of factor tests in legal 
analysis. Using a series of case studies, the Article examines the causes and 
consequences of judges improperly compartmentalizing circumstantial 
evidence in price-fixing litigation. The Article concludes by showing that the 
failure to appreciate the probative synergy of plus factors has led courts to 
make it effectively impossible to prove collusion through circumstantial 
evidence in price-fixing cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Because price fixing is an inherently clandestine crime, antitrust 
plaintiffs can rarely produce the proverbial smoking gun to prove that 
parallel price increases are the product of competitor collusion. Price-fixing 
conspiracies are complicated puzzles with many pieces. A court cannot 
discern the full picture if the pieces are observed one at a time, unconnected 
to their adjoining pieces. Yet despite the fact that a consensus exists that 
price-fixing cartels are intrinsically bad, 1  federal courts routinely 
disaggregate all the pieces of circumstantial evidence of competitor collusion 
 
 1 See William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors 
and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 398 (2011). 
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in a way that creates almost insurmountable burdens for private plaintiffs 
seeking to prove price-fixing claims. This Article explains how. 
The Supreme Court long ago recognized that antitrust cases are 
complex and that fact finders need to examine all of an antitrust plaintiff’s 
evidence in context. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon 
Corp.,2 a unanimous Court famously pronounced that antitrust “plaintiffs 
should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly 
compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate 
clean after scrutiny of each. ‘. . . [T]he character and effect of a conspiracy 
are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but 
only by looking at it as a whole.’”3 The Continental Ore rule instructs federal 
judges not to evaluate individual pieces of evidence in isolation from the 
surrounding evidence. 
The Court’s rule, though uncontroversial, is regularly ignored. With 
increasing frequency, lower federal courts in price-fixing cases improperly 
isolate each piece of circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff and 
then deny it all probative value because that single piece of evidence is 
insufficient, by itself, to prove a price-fixing conspiracy. Even when courts 
give lip service to their obligation to consider antitrust plaintiffs’ 
circumstantial evidence holistically, they routinely segregate the evidence 
and fail to “look[] at it as a whole” as commanded by Continental Ore. As a 
result, federal courts routinely grant summary judgment to price-fixing 
defendants, even when plaintiffs have proffered more than enough evidence 
to prove their case. 
Part I reviews the relevant substantive antitrust law. The foundation of 
any price-fixing claim is evidence of an agreement among competitors. 
Direct evidence of a collusive agreement is rarely available because price 
fixers go to great lengths to conceal their collusion.4 Given that, antitrust law 
has long allowed plaintiffs to prove an agreement through circumstantial 
evidence. The circumstantial case to prove a price-fixing agreement 
generally entails the plaintiff showing that the defendants engaged in parallel 
conduct and that certain “plus factors” are present. Antitrust law uses the 
label “plus factors” to describe evidence that tends to show that the 
defendants’ parallel conduct was caused by collusion rather than 
independent decision-making. 
Part II develops a typology of plus factors. Using antitrust case law, 
empirical research, and economic theory, this Part categorizes dozens of plus 
 
 2 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
 3 Id. at 699 (quoting United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913)). 
 4  Christopher R. Leslie, How to Hide a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Denial, Deception, and Destruction 
of Evidence, 2020–2021 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). 
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factors and explains the significance of individual plus factors and their 
relationships with each other. The first category of plus factors addresses 
“Cartel Susceptibility,” which asks whether a particular market lends itself 
to cartel activity. This analysis turns on factors such as market structure, 
including market concentration, barriers to entry, and product homogeneity. 
The next category of plus factors relates to “Cartel Formation,” including 
whether there was an invitation to collude, a motive to do so, an opportunity 
to conspire, and evidence of intercompetitor communications. Opportunity 
and communications also belong to the third category of plus factors: “Cartel 
Management.” Price-fixing conspiracies require ongoing maintenance, and 
several plus factors—intercompetitor exchange of price information, price 
signaling, and possession of a competitor’s price-related documents—
recognize this. Most cartels develop enforcement systems to deter and 
penalize cheating among cartel members. These systems form the fourth 
category of plus factors, “Cartel Enforcement,” which includes cartel 
monitoring devices (such as sharing sales data) and cartel punishments (such 
as side payments and other intercompetitor transactions). A fifth category of 
plus factors is “Cartel Markers,” which describes conduct that commonly 
indicates price collusion. A sixth category of plus factors can be categorized 
as “Suspicious Statements” by defendants, such as inculpatory statements 
made during the course of the alleged conspiracy or pretextual statements 
intended to provide a defense. Finally, there are a few “Multipurpose Plus 
Factors” that are impossible to pigeonhole into just one category because 
they perform multiple functions for cartel managers. Part II concludes by 
explaining the importance of having a plus-factor typology. 
Part III introduces and develops the concept of probative synergy, 
which describes how the probative value of each individual plus factor 
increases as additional plus factors are introduced into consideration. The 
Supreme Court in Continental Ore established that plus factors should not 
be viewed in isolation. Some plus factors—which might not seem 
particularly probative of a price-fixing conspiracy on their own—may 
become considerably more important when accompanied by certain other 
plus factors. Harnessing the insights from the plus-factor typology, this Part 
explains the legal significance of plaintiffs presenting evidence of plus 
factors across a range of categories. Understanding probative synergy should 
dissuade judges from isolating evidence and, consequently, improperly 
dismissing price-fixing claims or granting summary judgment to defendants 
as a result of viewing such evidence in isolation. 
Part IV explains how, despite the long-held rule that courts should not 
compartmentalize an antitrust plaintiff’s evidence of conspiracy, courts often 
inappropriately isolate individual plus factors and incorrectly suggest that if 
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a plus factor does not by itself prove collusion, then it is not a plus factor at 
all. This approach completely miscomprehends the entire structure of factor 
tests in legal analysis. Even when courts are correct to conclude that an 
individual plus factor is insufficient on its own to prove an agreement, they 
are wrong to then assert that the plus factor has no legal significance. After 
discussing evidence of several—sometimes over a dozen—plus factors in 
isolation, courts often then neglect to analyze the plaintiff’s evidence 
holistically. Using a series of case studies, this Part examines the causes and 
consequences of judges improperly compartmentalizing circumstantial 
evidence in price-fixing litigation. 
This Article concludes by showing that the judicial failure to appreciate 
the probative synergy of plus factors has made it effectively impossible to 
prove collusion through circumstantial evidence in many cases. This 
undermines deterrence of price fixing and destabilizes this cornerstone of 
American antitrust law. 
I. THE ROLE OF PLUS FACTORS IN PRICE-FIXING LITIGATION 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns conspiracies in restraint of 
trade.5 To prove a violation, antitrust plaintiffs must show (1) an agreement 
that (2) unreasonably restrains trade and (3) inflicts antitrust injury on the 
plaintiff. Conspiracies among business rivals to fix price, called horizontal 
price-fixing agreements in antitrust parlance, are per se illegal, meaning that, 
as a matter of law, such an agreement unreasonably restrains trade. Thus, if 
the injured plaintiff proves an agreement and an antitrust injury, antitrust 
liability automatically attaches. 
Although plaintiffs can easily prove a price-fixing claim if they have 
direct evidence of an agreement among competitors, such evidence is rarely 
available.6 But plaintiffs do not need direct evidence.7 Antitrust law allows 
plaintiffs to use circumstantial evidence to prove collusion.8 Most private 
 
 5 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 6 Christopher R. Leslie, The Decline and Fall of Circumstantial Evidence in Antitrust Law, 69 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1713, 1723 (2020). 
 7 Id. at 1724; In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (“[D]irect allegations of conspiracy are not always possible given the secret nature of conspiracies. 
Nor are direct allegations necessary.”). 
 8 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Direct evidence of 
conspiracy is not a sine qua non, however. Circumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust 
conspiracy.”); Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]hile direct evidence, the proverbial ‘smoking-gun,’ is generally the most compelling means by 
which a plaintiff can make out his or her claim, it is also frequently difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to 
come by. Thus, plaintiffs have been permitted to rely solely on circumstantial evidence (and the 
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plaintiffs rely on circumstantial evidence to prove their cases.9 Courts have 
developed a two-step method for proving price-fixing agreements through 
circumstantial evidence. First, the plaintiff shows that the defendants 
engaged in similar conduct, referred to as “conscious parallelism.” The 
Supreme Court has defined “conscious parallelism” as “the process, not in 
itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share 
monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and 
their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.”10 
Conscious parallelism is, by itself, insufficient to prove an agreement.11 
Second, plaintiffs present plus factors, 12  which constitute circumstantial 
evidence that indicates that the defendants colluded.13 These factors, “when 
viewed in conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve to allow a fact finder 
to infer a conspiracy.”14 Plus factors can “establish that the defendants were 
not engaging merely in oligopolistic price maintenance or price leadership 
 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom) to prove a conspiracy.” (quoting Rossi v. Standard 
Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 465 (3d Cir. 1998))); Gen. Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231, 
1233 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Even a successful antitrust plaintiff will seldom be able to offer a direct evidence 
of a conspiracy and such evidence is not a requirement.”); City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., 
360 F. Supp. 3d 730, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“‘[C]ircumstantial evidence is the lifeblood of antitrust law’ 
because direct evidence will rarely be available to prove the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy.” 
(quoting United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973))); United States v. Apple 
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Because unlawful conspiracies tend to form in secret, 
however, proof of a conspiracy will rarely consist of explicit agreements.”), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 9 See ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 553–54 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 10 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). 
 11  See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“Accordingly, evidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable inference of a 
conspiracy. To move the ball across the goal line, a plaintiff must also show that certain plus factors are 
present.” (citation omitted)). 
 12 In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Because the evidence of 
conscious parallelism is circumstantial in nature, courts are concerned that they do not punish unilateral, 
independent conduct of competitors. They therefore require that evidence of a defendant’s parallel pricing 
be supplemented with ‘plus factors.’” (citation omitted)); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 
1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[A]n agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only 
when ‘plus factors’ exist.”). 
 13 Plus factors are not the only form of circumstantial evidence. For example, expert testimony can 
also constitute circumstantial evidence that is not strictly a plus factor but often involves cartel experts 
explaining how particular facts are indicative of price fixing. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 
768 F.3d 1245, 1264 (10th Cir. 2014) (providing examples of plaintiffs providing expert testimony as 
evidence); John E. Lopatka, Economic Expert Evidence: The Understandable and the “Huh?,” 
61 ANTITRUST BULL. 434, 439 (2016) (“An expert can testify as to the significance of conditions 
conducive to collusion as well as the presence of those conditions and tip-offs of collusion in a particular 
case.”).  
 14 Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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but rather in a collusive agreement to fix prices or otherwise restrain trade.”15 
Each plus factor is a piece of circumstantial evidence. No court has created 
a comprehensive list of plus factors,16 and although there is no minimum or 
threshold number of plus factors that an antitrust plaintiff must present,17 
most plaintiffs try to plead as many as the evidence supports. 
Most importantly for our purposes, in evaluating whether plus factors 
establish an agreement among the defendants, the plus factors presented 
should not be evaluated in isolation; rather, the fact finder must analyze the 
plus factors holistically, as a group, and in relation to each other.18 In the 
context of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in price-fixing 
cases, “a court ‘should not tightly compartmentalize the evidence put 
forward by the nonmovant, but instead should analyze it as a whole to see if 
it supports an inference of concerted action.’”19 As noted in the Introduction, 
the Supreme Court memorably opined in Continental Ore Co. v. Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp. that judges and juries should not compartmentalize 
or dismember an antitrust plaintiff’s proffer of proof but should instead look 
at the evidence “as a whole.”20 All circuits recognize this foundational rule 
of antitrust law.21 
The issue in evaluating a plaintiff’s case is not whether any individual 
plus factor on its own creates an inference that defendants colluded but 
whether the totality of plus factors, taken as a whole, would allow a 
 
 15 Capitol Body Shop, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1234 (M.D. Fla. 
2016) (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 571 (11th Cir. 1998)); see also 
In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (“[Plus factors] show that the allegedly wrongful conduct of the defense 
was conscious and not the result of independent business decisions of the competitors.”). 
 16 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d 
at 122).  
 17 See Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 207 (3d Cir. 2017) (Stengel, 
J., dissenting) (first citing In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 n.12; and then Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, 
Inc. v. Darling-Delaware, 998 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 18 In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2016) (“‘Plus 
factors’ must be evaluated holistically.” (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 424 (4th 
Cir. 2015))); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 351, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations must be examined holistically.”). 
 19 In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357 (quoting Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1230). 
 20 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962) (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 106 (6th Cir. 
1944)).  
 21 See, e.g., Erie County v. Morton Salt, Inc., 702 F.3d 860, 870 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We must consider 
these factors together, not in isolation, to determine whether they give rise to a plausible inference of 
conspiracy.”); JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 2A:6 (2020) (collecting dozens of 
other cases).  
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reasonable jury to infer collusion. 22  By their very nature, price-fixing 
conspiracies involve many moving parts that “cannot be compartmentalized 
and considered in isolation ‘as if they were separate lawsuits, thereby 
overlooking the conspiracy claim itself.’”23 As one court explained, “Pieces 
of a puzzle viewed separately form unintelligible, irregular shapes, but 
considered together reveal a discernible image.”24 Thus, it is important to 
examine circumstantial evidence of price fixing holistically because “while 
each of these factors taken in isolation does not necessarily provide a basis 
alone for inferring an agreement or conspiracy, in combination, these factors, 
taken together and ‘on the ground,’ may support a reasonable inference that 
an agreement or conspiracy existed.” 25  While it is easy (and 
noncontroversial) to implore judges and juries to look at a plaintiff’s 
evidence as a whole, this task is easier said than done unless they understand 
why particular plus factors are evidence of collusion and how these plus 
factors interact with each other. Part II begins to answer these questions by 
laying out a typology of plus factors. 
II. A TYPOLOGY OF PLUS FACTORS 
 Plus factors are probative of collusion because they demonstrate—or 
are relevant to—various aspects of the price-fixing process. One cannot fully 
appreciate plus factors without understanding how price-fixing conspiracies 
form and operate. This Part explores the mechanics of price fixing and 
explains why various plus factors represent evidence of conspiracy. Each 
plus factor serves a function or purpose in the price fixers’ scheme to replace 
competition with collusion. Although examples of plus factors abound in 
 
 22 Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 47 (1st Cir. 2013) (“While each of 
[plaintiff’s] allegations of circumstantial [evidence of] agreement standing alone may not be sufficient to 
imply agreement, taken together, they provide a sufficient basis to plausibly contextualize the agreement 
necessary for pleading a § 1 claim.”); Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“[W]hen examining the sufficiency of what the plaintiff has adduced, [courts] are not to ‘tightly 
compartmentalize the evidence,’ but rather [courts] must evaluate it as a whole to see if it supports an 
inference of concerted action.” (quoting Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1230)); In re Processed Egg Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 902 F. Supp. 2d 704, 710 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“In evaluating an allegation that a defendant 
agreed to an alleged conspiracy, a court should not ‘compartmentalize’ the conspiracy. The ‘character 
and effect of [the] conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but 
only by looking at it as a whole.’” (quoting Cont’l Ore, 370 U.S. at 699)). 
 23 Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 155 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting In re Fine 
Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 24 Six W. Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 CIV. 5499(DNE), 2000 WL 
264295, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2000). 
 25 In re Med. X–Ray Film Antitrust Litig., 946 F. Supp. 209, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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both antitrust case law and scholarship,26 no court or scholar has laid out the 
universe of recognized plus factors and described why they indicate that 
collusion has occurred and how they relate to each other.27 This Part fills that 
lacuna by placing plus factors in a comprehensive framework.  
This typology places court-recognized plus factors in the following 
categories: Cartel Susceptibility; Cartel Formation; Cartel Management; 
Cartel Enforcement; Cartel Markers; Suspicious Statements and Silences; 
and, finally, Multipurpose Plus Factors. This Part also notes some plus 
factors that fall outside the typology. Having an appropriate typology serves 
the Supreme Court’s edict in Continental Ore that an antitrust plaintiff’s 
evidence should be analyzed holistically. Each plus factor provides context 
for analyzing the remaining plus factors. Judges and juries, however, cannot 
fully appreciate the contextual significance of a plaintiff’s proffered plus 
factors without knowing why each of these plus factors is probative of 
collusion. By exploring the significance of individual plus factors and the 
functional relationships among them, this Part provides the necessary 
background for appreciating the critical mistakes that courts make when 
conducting plus-factor analysis, which are explored in Part IV. 
Across this typology, trust is a common theme. Many of the plus factors 
involve attempts to create trust—or efforts to compensate for a lack of 
trust—among market competitors who are also coconspirators in a price-
fixing cartel. Because every firm in a cartel can increase its short-term profits 
by cheating on the cartel agreement and selling more than its cartel allotment, 
most price-fixing conspiracies require a certain level of trust among the 
cartel partners that their coconspirators will not cheat.28 Trust can convert a 
short-term conspiracy into a long-term cartel.29 Absent mutual trust, firms 
may rationally conclude that the expected benefits of participating in a 
conspiracy do not adequately compensate for the considerable costs, 
including potential antitrust liability. The most successful cartels are those 
that establish a sufficient modicum of trust among the member firms so that 
 
 26 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 55–93 (2d ed. 2001) (listing several plus factors).  
 27 See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st Century, 9 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 97, 103 (1997) (noting that “courts have failed to establish an analytical framework 
that explains why specific plus factors have stronger or weaker evidentiary value or presents a hierarchy 
of such factors”). 
 28 See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 546–62 (2004). 
 29 See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Studies of Cartel Stability: A Comparison of 
Methodological Approaches, in HOW CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL 
COLLUSION 9, 42 (Peter Z. Grossman ed., 2004) (“The expectations that participants have about 
competitors’ propensity to cooperate can make all the difference in whether collusion is successful or 
not.”). 
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they will not cheat on the agreement by charging less than the agreed-upon 
price and will not expose the cartel to antitrust authorities in exchange for 
leniency in criminal prosecution.30 Because trust among business rivals is not 
the default mode, price fixers must work to cultivate trust, sometimes starting 
small and growing the cartel as trust allows. As discussed below, many plus 
factors acknowledge this fact. 
The typology represented in this Part constructs several distinct 
categories, each of which describes why a particular plus factor is probative 
of price fixing. Some individual plus factors can reside in more than one 
category. Similarly, a single piece of evidence can establish multiple plus 
factors, including plus factors across different categories within this 
typology. Most notably, interfirm communications are relevant to Cartel 
Formation, Cartel Management, and Cartel Enforcement. Thus, the fact that 
a particular plus factor is discussed in one category of the typology does not 
mean that it is irrelevant to other categories. 
A. Cartel Susceptibility 
Several plus factors relate to whether a market has characteristics that 
render it more susceptible to cartelization, including market concentration, 
high entry barriers, inelastic demand, an absence of substitutes, and markets 
with homogenous products. Even before firms in a particular market have 
engaged in any anticompetitive conduct, the structure of that market may 
encourage price-fixing efforts.31 Market structure is an umbrella term that 
includes many separate variables, such as market concentration and the 
presence of barriers to entry.  
Market concentration is an important factor to examine because markets 
with fewer firms are more susceptible to cartelization—a smaller group of 
competitors is better able to solve the coordination and trust problems that 
can prevent cartel formation or destabilize an existing cartel.32 A smaller 
number of negotiators makes it easier for the conspirators to agree on a cartel 
price, to allocate market shares, to conceal their collusion, to develop 
enforcement mechanisms, and to detect and punish cheaters.33 Empirically, 
 
 30 See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 
453, 462–65 (2006). 
 31 George A. Hay, Horizontal Agreements: Concept and Proof, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 877, 885 
(2006). 
 32 Leslie, supra note 28, at 564–65. 
 33 See Kai Hüschelrath & Jürgen Weigand, Fighting Hard Core Cartels, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION 307, 325–26 (Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand eds., 2d ed. 2013) 
(“[B]ecause negotiations (and the subsequent monitoring) among ten parties is typically more complex 
and expensive than negotiations among only three parties . . . , ceteris paribus, a cartel in the three-firm 
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concentrated markets are more prone to price fixing, 34 and, thus, market 
concentration is a plus factor.35 
A market with high barriers to entry is also more conducive to collusion. 
To maximize long-term profits, the cartel-fixed price must be sufficiently 
high to warrant participating in a criminal conspiracy (and, thus, risking 
criminal sanctions as well as treble damages) but not so high as to lure new 
competitors into the market. When a market is protected by high barriers to 
entry, conspirators are better able to fix a high price with less worry that new 
firms will come into the market and bid the price down. In contrast, firms 
may not bother to conspire to fix prices if interlopers cannot be excluded 
from the market. Thus, high barriers to entry are often correlated with price-
fixing activity and constitute a plus factor.36  
Demand elasticity affects whether price fixing is likely to be profitable. 
When demand is inelastic, a seller with market power can charge a higher 
price without losing significant sales. This market characteristic encourages 
collusion because rivals can collectively raise price profitably.37 Judges have 
recognized inelastic demand as a plus factor.38  
 
market is more likely than in a ten-firm market.”); George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey 
of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13, 24 (1974) (“The results of the present study . . . suggest 
that the low cost of planning and enforcing a conspiracy and the smaller likelihood of being caught in 
concentrated markets[] are equally if not more significant factors in stimulating conspiracy.”); In re Text 
Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that because “the four defendants 
sell 90 percent” of the market, “it would not be difficult for such a small group to agree on prices and to 
be able to detect ‘cheating’”); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (stating that concentrated markets are amenable to concealing collusion). 
 34  Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical 
Analysis, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21, 23 (1977); Hay & Kelley, supra note 33, at 21; Richard A. Posner, A 
Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 399 (1970); cf. Margaret C. Levenstein 
& Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 58 (2006) (“There 
is no simple relationship between industry concentration and the likelihood of collusion. Most cartels in 
our case study sample were in relatively concentrated industries . . . .”). 
 35 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Generally speaking, the possibility of 
anticompetitive collusive practices is most realistic in concentrated industries.”); In re Blood Reagents 
Antitrust Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 750, 772 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 36  In re Blood Reagents, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 772 (“High barriers to entry also make an industry more 
conducive to collusion.” (citing In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 65 (2d Cir. 2012))). 
 37 Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS–POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1076–77 (E.D. Cal. 
2011) (“The structure of the Relevant Market makes collusion plausible, collusion is possible because of 
the concentrated supply controlled by defendants, the inelastic demand for tin mill products would force 
customers to purchase from defendants.”). 
 38 Id.; In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2010); United States 
v. Alcoa, Inc., No. CIV. A.2000–954(RMU., 2001 WL 1335698, at *12 (D.D.C. June 21, 2001) 
(describing inelastic demand as conducive to collusion); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of 
Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
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The availability of reasonably interchangeable substitutes also affects 
the likelihood of price fixing. Because consumers are less likely to pay an 
inflated cartel price if they can easily switch to a lower-priced substitute for 
the cartelized product, an absence of substitutes is also a plus factor.39 
Finally, markets with homogeneous products are more susceptible to 
cartelization.40 When products in a market are homogeneous, it is easier for 
coconspirators to fix a single price, especially if the coconspirators have 
similar cost structures. If products are similar but heterogeneous, producers 
are less likely to share a common profit-maximizing price. 41  And when 
products are of varying quality, nonprice competition can supplant price 
competition and render attempts at cartelization unsustainable.42 In contrast, 
a standardized product facilitates price fixing by making coordination more 
straightforward43 and enabling price fixers to more easily detect cheating on 
the cartel agreement.44 Consequently, courts recognize product homogeneity 
as a plus factor.45 
 
 39 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
because there were “no close substitutes for” the cartelized product, “[a]n attempt to raise price above 
cost would not be likely to come to grief by causing a hemorrhage of business to sellers in other markets”). 
 40 See Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946) (“[I]t was easier to 
reach the goal of uniform prices on a standard product than on one which was not.”); In re Titanium 
Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 822 (D. Md. 2013) (“Indicators that a market is conducive 
to collusion include the homogeneous and highly standardized, or commodity-like nature, of the product; 
a concentrated market dominated by a few sellers; high barriers to new players’ entry, such as high 
investment or fixed costs; and excess production capacity.”). 
 41 Joseph J. Simons, Fixing Price with Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion with Competitor-Based 
Formula Pricing Clauses, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 599, 628 n.167 (1989); see also Peter Asch & Joseph J. 
Seneca, Characteristics of Collusive Firms, 23 J. INDUS. ECON. 223, 224 (1975) (“[I]n a standardized 
product market, coordinated pricing will clearly involve identical or near-identical levels . . . . For this 
reason, there is some expectation that collusion will occur with relative frequency in homogenous product 
markets.”). Firms selling higher-quality goods probably have a higher profit-maximizing price, and firms 
selling lower-quality goods will not want to charge the exact same price as their rivals selling higher-
quality goods because if the prices are identical, rational consumers will purchase the higher-quality good. 
 42 Fraas & Greer, supra note 34, at 38 (“In the absence of standardized (homogeneous) products, a 
price fixing agreement may be difficult to maintain because competition could then center on nonprice 
matters.”). 
 43  In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 656–57 (“[When] the product . . . is highly 
standardized[,] . . . [t]his is another reason why a successful conspiracy would not require such frequent 
communications as to make prompt detection likely.”). 
 44 MARK JEPHCOTT, LAW OF CARTELS 13 (2d ed. 2011) (“The nature of the products also affects the 
ease with which cheating can be detected. When products are homogeneous, not only is it easier for firms 
to agree on the appropriate cartel price but detection is easier.”). 
 45 See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 656–57 (noting that the product was “highly 
standardized,” which facilitated price collusion); In re Titanium Dioxide, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 822 
(“Indicators that a market is conducive to collusion include the homogeneous and highly standardized, or 
commodity-like nature, of the product . . . .”). 
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For all of these reasons, a market structure conducive to collusion 
constitutes circumstantial evidence to support a price-fixing claim.46 Market 
structure, however, is not a single plus factor but rather a set of separate plus 
factors, including market concentration, entry barriers, inelastic demand, 
absence of substitutes, and product homogeneity. While each individual 
component of market structure operates as a plus factor, the presence of a 
combination of these market characteristics is particularly probative 47 
because a market with more than one of these features is even more 
susceptible to collusion. 
B. Cartel Formation 
Every conspiracy has an origin story. Understanding a conspiracy’s 
beginnings can help make sense of the many seemingly unrelated anecdotal 
pieces of circumstantial evidence that, when viewed collectively, 
demonstrate how and why the conspirators combined to violate the law. Plus 
factors within the cartel-formation category include invitations to collude 
and other communication among defendants. In the context of price-fixing 
conspiracies, collusion often evolves either from a group of competitors 
(sometimes meeting for ostensibly legal reasons) extemporaneously 
agreeing to collude or from a single firm acting as a ringleader and proposing 
to one or more of its rivals that they cease competing against each other. 
The first type of origin story entails impromptu collusion and 
exemplifies Adam Smith’s oft-repeated insight that “[p]eople of the same 
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance 
to raise prices.”48 Although Smith overstated the seeming inevitability of 
 
 46 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Parallel behavior of 
a sort anomalous in a competitive market is thus a symptom of price fixing, though standing alone it is 
not proof of it; and an industry structure that facilitates collusion constitutes supporting evidence of 
collusion.”).  
 47 See In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“The salient 
features of the blood reagents market—described in the Complaint as one that is highly concentrated, 
contains high barriers to entry, has inelastic demand, lacks reasonable substitutes, and is based on a 
standardized product—are each conducive to transforming that motive into action.”); Blomkest Fertilizer, 
Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1044 (8th Cir. 2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting); see 
also Hay, supra note 31, at 885 (“Specific factors would include the degree of market concentration, the 
ease of entry, the homogeneity of the product, transparency of prices, and the presence or absence of large 
buyers.”); Hay & Kelley, supra note 33, at 26–27 (“A brief summary of our empirical results would be 
that conspiracy among competitors may arise in any number of situations but it is most likely to occur 
and endure when numbers are small, concentration is high and the product is homogeneous.”). 
 48 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 55 
(Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) (1776).  
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price-fixing conspiracies springing forth from competitor get-togethers,49 his 
observation is not without foundation. Many illegal cartels have, in fact, 
spontaneously commenced and grown from innocent encounters among 
rivals, such as trade-association meetings or social functions.50 
An alternative starting point for price-fixing conspiracies involves what 
is generally referred to in antitrust law as an “invitation to collude.” Several 
antitrust opinions have treated an invitation to collude as an important plus 
factor.51 The Federal Trade Comission (FTC) has defined an invitation to 
collude as “an improper communication from a firm to an actual or potential 
competitor that the firm is ready and willing to coordinate on price or output 
or other important terms of competition.” 52  Perhaps the most notorious 
invitation to collude in antitrust jurisprudence involved Robert L. Crandall, 
the president of American Airlines, attempting to fix ticket prices on certain 
air routes by telephoning Howard Putnam, the president of Braniff Airlines, 
and saying, “I have a suggestion for you. Raise your goddamn fares twenty 
percent. I’ll raise mine the next morning . . . You’ll make more money and I 
will too.”53 This invitation to collude did not result in Section 1 litigation 
because, far from accepting Crandall’s invitation and fixing prices, Putnam 
recorded the telephone call and shared it with the government, which sued 
American Airlines for illegal attempted monopolization under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act.54 Most invitees, though, are not as proactive as Putnam. 
Thus, when such invitations precede parallel price increases, courts observe 
that “[o]ne of the strongest circumstantial indicators of a conspiracy is the 
existence of a common invitation or request to join into a concerted plan of 
action.”55 An invitation to collude is an important plus factor because it is 
 
 49 See United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2002).  
 50 See, e.g., JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 141 (2d ed. 2008) (noting how social visits 
were used to start the international citric acid price-fixing conspiracy); JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN 
CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 136 (1962); Walter 
Adams, The Steel Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY: SOME CASE STUDIES 148, 150–
51 (Walter Adams ed., 1954) (recounting how Judge Gary, president of U.S. Steel, stabilized industry 
prices by hosting his famous “Gary dinners” to which he invited his rivals and discussed pricing). 
 51 See In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2017) 
(“Numerous cases have recognized that an invitation to collude can serve as evidence of a conspiracy.”), 
aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 714 F. App’x 986 (11th Cir. 2018); Gainesville Utils. Dep’t 
v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1978); Fishman v. Wirtz, Nos. 74 C 2814 & 
78 C 3621, 1981 WL 2153, at *59 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1981) (“One of the strongest circumstantial 
indicators of a conspiracy is the existence of a common invitation or request to join into a concerted plan 
of action.”). 
 52 In re Fortiline, LLC, No. 151-0000, 2016 WL 4379041, at *11 (F.T.C. Aug. 9, 2016). 
 53 United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 54  Id. 
 55 Fishman, 1981 WL 2153, at *59. 
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half of the element of “agreement.” The solicitation “shows conspiratorial 
state of mind on the part of the solicitor and may also indicate that the 
solicitor was acting upon an earlier agreement.”56 The invitation to collude 
is, thus, powerful circumstantial evidence even without direct proof of 
acceptance of the invitation.57 
Both of these paths to conspiracy—group creation and individual 
initiative—generally involve the two elements common to most criminal 
activity: motive and opportunity. In the context of antitrust conspiracies, 
motive to collude is a plus factor.58 Motive evidence is important because it 
shows why these particular defendants would seek to replace competition 
with collusion, and it demonstrates the plausibility of the plaintiffs’ claims 
that these defendants engaged in price fixing.59 
Showing that the defendants had the opportunity to conspire is also an 
important plus factor. 60  Communication among defendants is a well-
recognized plus factor related to the opportunity to conspire.61 Evidence of 
interfirm messages and conversations can be powerful circumstantial 
evidence of collusion because cartel members generally must communicate 
with each other in order to negotiate the cartel agreement and all of its details. 
This often involves much more than setting a single price. Many cartels must 
fix multiple prices on multiple products, as well as reach accords on 
production levels, currency exchange rates, market allocation, and cartel-
 
 56 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(Gibson, J., dissenting). 
 57  Id. (“Besides serving as direct evidence of a particular agreement, a solicitation might be 
circumstantial evidence of an ongoing conspiracy. Although no favorable response to the solicitation is 
shown, the solicitation itself might be the product of a prior agreement.” (quoting 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, 
ANTITRUST LAW § 1419c (1986))); see also LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 
78 (2013).  
 58 Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing “evidence that the 
defendant had a motive to enter into a price fixing conspiracy” as a plus factor (citation omitted)); 
Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 859 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that “motivation to enter into an 
agreement requiring parallel behavior” is a plus factor (citation omitted)).  
 59 See Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 728 F. Supp. 2d 130, 159 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“A conspiracy 
may be economically plausible if the defendants had a motive to engage in the conspiracy.”). 
 60 See, e.g., Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that, 
in combination with other factors, opportunity to conspire supports a finding of conspiracy); In re 
Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1297 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (noting that evidence 
of opportunities for communication and exchange of information “indisputably facilitates and supports 
an inference of an agreement”). 
 61  Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1033 (“Courts have held that a high level of communications among 
competitors can constitute a plus factor which, when combined with parallel behavior, supports an 
inference of conspiracy.”); In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 983 (N.D. 
Ohio 2015) (“Evidence of communications between competitors can serve as circumstantial evidence of 
price-fixing.”). 
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enforcement mechanisms (including auditing procedures, penalties for 
cheating, and dispute-resolution systems). 62  Making these decisions 
generally entails intercompetitor discussions to establish the cartel 
operations.63 
Furthermore, communication helps build trust among competitors, 64 
which is critical to both Cartel Formation and Cartel Management.65 The 
greater the number and duration of communications, the more that trust can 
be created.66 This is true in general, but particularly with respect to price-
fixing conspiracies. Professor Salil Mehra has explained that “experimental 
economists have found that face-to-face communication of promises in cartel 
simulation games, even where such promises are unenforceable, helps 
human players build the trust they need to cooperate in maintaining a 
cartel.”67 In short, intercompetitor communications are an important plus 
factor because they can indicate communication on cartel issues. 
C. Cartel Management 
After a cartel is formed, it must be managed. Fixed prices often require 
renegotiation in light of changing consumer demand, foreign exchange rates, 
and other unanticipated circumstances. 68  Consequently, many cartels are 
ongoing conspiracies, and managing the conspiracy may entail several 
specific types of communications and interactions. This Section describes 
three such interactions—exchanges of price information, price signaling, and 
possession of a competitor’s price-related documents—which are all 
separate plus factors for inferring collusion. 
 
 62 See Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
813, 827, 831, 834–36 (2011). 
 63 Christopher R. Leslie, Balancing the Conspiracy’s Books: Inter-Competitor Sales and Price-
Fixing Cartels, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2018). 
 64 Leslie, supra note 28, at 538–39. 
 65 See sources cited supra notes 28–30. 
 66 Leslie, supra note 28, at 538–39 (“Communication seems to have a linear relationship with trust. 
The more time that subjects have to communicate, the greater their cooperation; the more communications 
that are exchanged, the greater the cooperation.”). 
 67 Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 1323, 1356–57 (2016). 
 68 See Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 62, at 833. 
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1. Exchange of Price Information 
Intercompetitor exchanges of price information are more probative of 
conspiracy than mere intercompetitor communications in general. 69 
Exchanging price information is potentially anticompetitive because it often 
leads to uniform prices being charged by those competitors who are sharing 
price information. 70  Information exchanges facilitate price coordination 71 
and help cartel members monitor each other’s pricing to ensure that nobody 
is cheating by charging less than the cartel-fixed price.72 Empirically, firms 
in price-fixing cartels often share their pricing information with each other.73 
Consequently, exchanging price information is a plus factor.74 
2. Price Signaling 
Price signaling describes generally public communications by a firm 
designed to indicate to its competitors its present or future pricing intentions. 
Although the label “fixed prices” implies inflexibility, cartel-fixed prices 
 
 69 Indeed, in some circumstances, the exchange of price information can itself violate the Sherman 
Act. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining how such agreements 
can violate the rule of reason). 
 70 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (“The exchange of price data 
tends toward price uniformity.”). 
 71 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1047 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(Gibson, J., dissenting) (“The price communications in this case are more like those in In re Coordinated 
Pretrial Proceedings, 906 F.2d at 448, which served ‘little purpose’ other than facilitating price 
coordination.”). 
 72 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 174 (4th ed. 2010) 
(“Exchanges of price information . . . facilitate[] the competitors’ detecting others ‘cheating’ on their tacit 
agreement.”); see infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (discussing price verification as form of 
cartel monitoring); Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1047 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“[I]f there were a cartel, it would 
be crucial for the cartel members to cooperate in telling each other about actual prices charged in order 
to prevent the sort of widespread discounting that would eventually sink the cartel.”); see also United 
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 456 (1978) (“Price concessions by oligopolists generally yield 
competitive advantages only if secrecy can be maintained; when the terms of the concession are made 
publicly known, other competitors are likely to follow and any advantage to the initiator is lost in the 
process.”). 
 73 See, e.g., In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing conspirators 
sharing information on delivery charges); see also Leslie, supra note 28, at 575 (noting the sharing of 
price information in cartels for corrugated containers, wool, cement, and sugar, among others). 
 74 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 452 (9th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Plus factors commonly 
considered by courts include . . . information sharing.” (citing Todd, 275 F.3d at 198)); In re Tyson Foods, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d 970, 995 (W.D. Ark. 2017) (“To be sure, [t]he broadcasting of sensitive 
business information . . . is . . . circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy among competitors . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1297 (M.D. 
Fla. 2016) (noting that intercompetitor “information exchange . . . indisputably facilitates and supports 
an inference of an agreement” (citation omitted)); see also KAPLOW, supra note 57, at 81 (discussing how 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969), treated 
intercompetitor price exchanges as evidence of illegal collusion).  
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often fluctuate. These movements, however, are manipulated by the price 
fixers themselves. Prices may need to respond to external stimuli, such as 
changes in demand or the costs of inputs. Or the fixed price may increase 
when cartel ringleaders believe that the market can bear a higher price that 
will increase cartel profits. Alternatively, the price may need to be adjusted 
downward in response to government scrutiny or consumer pressure, or in 
order to punish a new market entrant or renegade cartel member.75 
Managing these price variations is important for cartel stability. 
Miscommunications must be avoided. Any downward movement in price by 
one cartel member could be misinterpreted by other cartel members as their 
partners cheating on the cartel, which could result in a tit-for-tat response of 
lowered prices that creates a chain reaction of reactive price decreases until 
the cartel dissolves into competition once again.76 Conversely, if a cartel 
member raises prices in anticipation of its coconspirators following suit and 
the coconspirators do not actually raise their prices, that could lead to 
feelings of distrust, which destabilize cartels. 
Price signaling addresses coordination problems common to cartels.77 
Depending on the size of the cartel, it can be difficult to have all of the cartel 
members gathered in the same physical space (or on the same conference 
call) at the same time. The public announcements of pricing plans solve this 
problem because cartel members can adjust price without having to meet in 
person or to create an evidentiary trail of exchanged emails or telephone 
calls. Because some courts treat intercompetitor communications as an 
important plus factor for inferring a conspiracy, a cartel is better off if it can 
substantially limit the number of conversations and the amount of two-way 
communications between coconspirators. 78  Furthermore, price signaling 
may allow colluding firms to jostle and adjust the market price in a manner 
that precludes consumers from being able to take advantage of temporary 
deviations from the cartel price.79 
Empirically, cartels use seemingly independent price announcements to 
coordinate their collusive price-fixing activities.80 In their study of cartel 
 
 75 Leslie, supra note 28, at 618–20 (discussing price wars initiated by cartels). 
 76 Id. at 526. 
 77 See William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 441 (2007). 
 78 See infra note 159 (noting that the number of communications is a plus factor).  
 79 David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence 
from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 388 (2001). 
 80 ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND 
BIDDING RINGS 114–15 (2012); see also Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Matthew E. Raiff, Cartel 
Price Announcements: The Vitamins Industry, 26 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 762, 762 (2008) (“As another 
example, in the Rubber Chemicals Cartel, one of the components of the conspiracy was ‘issuing price 
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price announcements in the vitamins industry, Professors Marshall, Marx, 
and Raiff noted that price-fixing “[c]artels commonly coordinate public price 
announcements by the member firms.”81 Cartels in the markets for “sorbates, 
monochloroacetic acid and organic peroxides, polyester staple, high pressure 
laminates, amino acids, carbonless paper, cartonboard, and graphite 
electrodes” all employed price signaling as part of their cartel operations.82 
Courts recognize price signaling as a plus factor.83 Such price signaling 
can take several forms, from sharing price lists to making advance price 
announcements, often weeks before a price increase is to take effect.84 The 
substance of the price announcements affects their probative value as 
evidence of collusion. For example, while it may make sense for a firm to 
independently make public announcements about current price lists, “a 
statement as to a series or pattern of expected price increases, the pre-
announcement of a price increase to occur in the future, or a public pledge 
to cease offering discounts, might, in appropriate circumstances, be 
construed as an assurance or commitment” to one’s coconspirators.85 Such 
preannouncements of price changes are classic cartel conduct.86 
 
announcements and price quotations in accordance with the agreements reached.’” (quoting Press 
Release, Dep’t of Just., Crompton Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty for Participating in Rubber 
Chemicals Cartel (Mar. 15, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04_at_160.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UN5U-PA57])); Craig A. Gallet & John R. Schroeter, The Effects of the Business Cycle 
on Oligopoly Coordination: Evidence from the U.S. Rayon Industry, 10 REV. INDUS. ORG. 181, 189 
(1995) (discussing price fixing in the rayon industry). 
 81 Marshall et al., supra note 80, at 762 (“For example, international cartels in the vitamins industry 
coordinated announcements of price increases, including the designation of which company would lead 
the price increase.”). 
 82 MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 80, at 115. 
 83 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 446–47 (9th 
Cir. 1990); In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 828 (D. Md. 2013) (“Frequent 
price increase announcements could have served as ‘signals,’ making further exchange of actual price 
information superfluous.”); see also In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 788 (N.D. 
Ill. 2017) (“Defendants’ public statements of intent to cut production are indicative of an agreement 
considering the commodity nature of Broilers.”). 
 84 The dynamics of price announcements as a cartel-facilitating device may be changing as computer 
algorithms can shorten the timing of advance price announcements from weeks to seconds. Ariel Ezrachi 
& Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1792. 
 85 Michael D. Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem 
of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 902 (1979); see also KAPLOW, 
supra note 57, at 277 (describing the advantages to cartel member firms of advance price announcements 
relative to unilateral price cuts, including avoiding alienating customers and being perceived by other 
cartel members as defecting).  
 86 Genesove & Mullin, supra note 79, at 388 (“Prior notification of impending actions was an integral 
part of the Sugar Institute mechanism. Institute rules required a firm to notify other members before 
selling damaged sugar, introducing new private brands, and changing any terms of trade.”). 
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3. Possession of a Competitor’s Price-Related Documents 
Price-fixing conspiracies vary significantly in the level of detail 
necessary to fix the market price. Many cartel agreements are extremely 
complicated, such as those involving multiple product categories.87 To keep 
track of the various prices fixed across a multitude of products, cartel 
members sometimes exchange their price lists and other pricing documents.88 
Firms are often in possession of a rival’s price sheets precisely because that 
rival shared it with its competitors as part of a price-fixing conspiracy.89 
Sharing confidential information beyond pricing is also a way to build trust 
among coconspirators. 90  For example, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) 
sought to create trust among the members of the international lysine cartel 
by sharing its proprietary data regarding production technologies, 
manufacturing costs, lysine production capacity, relevant employees, and 
planned pilot programs.91 For these reasons, a firm’s possession of its rival’s 
pricing policies, plans, records, and other confidential information is often 
symptomatic of an underlying agreement among competitors to coordinate 
prices. 
Because having copies of a rival’s confidential pricing plans is 
inherently suspicious, possession of a competitor’s documents is a plus 
factor that can help fact finders infer an agreement to fix prices. 92  In 
particular, the possession of rivals’ price lists before they are public can be 
evidence of collusion.93 Courts have reasoned that the sharing of cost and 
 
 87 See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 62, at 827–28 (discussing how some cartels needed to 
negotiate and fix several price schedules when multiple product categories were involved).  
 88 See, e.g., CONNOR, supra note 50, at 281 (discussing the vitamins cartel). 
 89 See, e.g., United States v. Therm-All, Inc., 373 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2004) (exemplifying a 
conspiracy case where a conspirator possessed its coconspirator-rival’s price sheets). 
 90 Leslie, supra note 28, at 572. 
 91 CONNOR, supra note 50, at 222–23; see id. at 213 (noting that all the technical data ADM shared 
with its rivals must have raised the level of trust: “[a]t the cartel’s first major meeting, ADM attempted 
to create trust by giving its best estimates of lysine capacities”).  
 92  See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 368–69 (3d Cir. 2004) (treating 
“competitors’ possession of each others’ price increase announcements” as a plus factor); see also Kleen 
Prods. LLC v. Georgia-Pac. LLC, 910 F.3d 927, 936 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[F]oreknowledge of price increases 
may be persuasive evidence that an agreement was afoot.”); Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 
759, 782 (2d Cir. 2016) (treating defendant’s “knowledge of other banks’ confidential individual 
submissions in advance” as circumstantial evidence of conspiracy); In re Interior Molded Doors Antitrust 
Litig., No. 3:18-cv-00718-JAG, 2019 WL 4478734, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18, 2019) (noting that “alleged 
advanced knowledge of [rival’s] price increases is precisely the sort of circumstantial or contextual 
evidence that creates a plausible inference of a conspiracy”). 
 93 See In re Bulk Popcorn Antitrust Litig., 783 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (D. Minn. 1991). 
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other proprietary data is also a plus factor because it makes “no economic 
sense” for rivals to exchange such sensitive data unless they are colluding.94 
D. Cartel Enforcement95 
In addition to managing any fluctuations in the collusive prices, 
conspirators often create enforcement mechanisms to address the risk that 
some cartel members may try to maximize their short-term profits by selling 
more than their cartel allotment. Even after agreeing to enter a price-fixing 
conspiracy, most firms would be better off in the short term if they cheated 
on the cartel agreement by charging a lower-than-cartel price and selling 
more than their cartel allotment. An effective enforcement system generally 
entails two components: monitoring for compliance and penalizing cheaters. 
A cartel’s efforts to monitor and penalize cartel violations may reveal several 
possible plus factors, including price-verification schemes, intercompetitor 
exchanges of sales data, side payments, and intercompetitor buybacks.96 
Price-fixing cartels pursue several methods to monitor compliance. For 
example, cartels are known to employ third-party auditors, independent 
cartel administrators, and even spies. 97  Most forms of cartel monitoring 
necessarily involve conspirators exchanging price and sales data. Some price 
exchanges involve price verification—the practice of a seller reporting to its 
competitors the details of completed transactions with specific customers.98 
This subset of price exchanges raises unique anticompetitive risks. Whereas 
presale exchanges of price information could be used to set the price for a 
specific upcoming sale, postsale price verifications are more likely to be used 
as a monitoring device because they reveal to a firm’s cartel partners its 
actual prices, which a firm in a competitive market would wish to keep 
 
 94 See In re High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., No. 00 MDL 1368(CLB), 2006 WL 1317023, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006). 
 95 In some ways, Cartel Enforcement is a subset of Cartel Management. Both of these aspects of 
cartel maintenance generally involve intercompetitor communications and other activity that occurs after 
cartel formation. While it is possible to include Cartel Enforcement in the previous discussion of Cartel 
Management, this typology treats Cartel Enforcement as a separate category to highlight some of the plus 
factors that are unique to this aspect of a price-fixing conspiracy. 
 96 In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th Cir. 2014) (treating monitoring and 
discipline as plus factors). 
 97 Leslie, supra note 28, at 612–15. 
 98 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969); In re Coordinated Pretrial 
Proc. in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 450 (9th Cir. 1990); see also CHRISTOPHER 
HARDING & JENNIFER EDWARDS, CARTEL CRIMINALITY: THE MYTHOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF 
BUSINESS COLLUSION 159–60 (2015) (explaining the lysine cartel’s use of price verification); id. at 179 
(noting the LCD panels cartel’s use of price verification).  
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secret.99 Price-verification schemes are evidence of conspiracy because such 
conduct makes little sense absent collusion.100 The logical reason that rivals 
would reciprocally report their actual sales prices is to monitor each other’s 
pricing pursuant to a conspiracy.101 Thus, some courts recognize that price-
verification schemes are a plus factor for demonstrating an underlying price-
fixing conspiracy.102  
 The exchange of sales data among competitors can also help stabilize a 
cartel agreement for much the same reason that sharing price information 
strengthens cartels. Sharing sales data provides a monitoring device for cartel 
managers to detect cheating by members who sell more than their cartel 
quota. 103  Empirically, cartels share sales data in order to monitor cartel 
compliance 104  and to help determine future cartel allotments. 105 
Consequently, intercompetitor exchanges of sales data represent an 
important plus factor for inferring collusion.106 
In addition to detecting deviations from the cartel agreement, many 
cartel managers also develop mechanisms to punish cheaters or provide 
adjustments to remedy innocent deviations from the conspirators’ agreed-
upon allotments. The most direct means for a cartel member that sells more 
 
 99 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 456 (1978) (“Thus, if one seller offers a price 
concession for the purpose of winning over one of his competitor’s customers, it is unlikely that the same 
seller will freely inform its competitor of the details of the concession so that it can be promptly matched 
and diffused.”). 
 100 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1047 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(Gibson, J., dissenting) (“[C]onfessing price-cutting to competitors makes no economic sense for 
independent actors, but makes perfect economic sense for cartel members.”). 
 101 Id. at 1046–47 (“[I]f there were a cartel, it would be crucial for the cartel members to cooperate 
in telling each other about actual prices charged in order to prevent the sort of widespread discounting 
that would eventually sink the cartel.”). 
 102 See Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143, 1148–49 (8th Cir. 1979).  
 103 CONNOR, supra note 50, at 294–95 (discussing the vitamin B2 cartel). 
 104 Id. at 315 (noting that in the choline chloride cartel, “[c]hecking prices on transactions was not 
feasible, so the major technique for detecting cheating was for the members to share their internal sales 
records with each other at the quarterly meetings”); id. at 152 (noting that the citric acid cartel exchanged 
sales data to “confirm adherence to the [market] share agreements”); Kovacic et al., supra note 1, at 424 
(“The conveyance of firm-specific production and sales information is important for monitoring 
compliance with many cartel agreements.”). 
 105 MARCO BERTILORENZI, THE INTERNATIONAL ALUMINIUM CARTEL, 1886–1978: THE BUSINESS 
AND POLITICS OF A COOPERATIVE INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTION 136–37 (2016).  
 106 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] horizontal price-fixing agreement 
may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such interdependent conduct is accompanied 
by circumstantial evidence and plus factors such as defendants’ use of facilitating practices. Information 
exchange is an example of a facilitating practice that can help support an inference of a price-fixing 
agreement.” (citations omitted)); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 351, 
368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also In re TFT–LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 09-5840 SI, 2012 
WL 4808425, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2012) (treating the exchange of supply information as a plus factor). 
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than its cartel allotment to compensate its underselling cartel partner is 
requiring the overseller to pay money to the underseller.107 Major cartels in 
aluminum, steel, cement, and graphic electrodes, for example, have all 
employed this method of enforcing their cartel. 108  Such side payments, 
however, have the major downsides of being readily observed and strongly 
suggestive of collusion. 109  To avoid the obviousness of one-way money 
transmissions, many price-fixing conspiracies balance their cartel books 
through intercompetitor sales, also called buybacks, in which a competitor 
(who sold more than its cartel allotment) purchases products from its rival 
(who sold less than its cartel allotment) even when the purchaser does not 
need the product or could produce that same product more efficiently itself.110 
Many courts have recognized that such buybacks represent a plus factor 
because such transactions are inherently suspicious and oftentimes are more 
consistent with collusion than competition.111 
E. Cartel Markers 
Some plus factors focus on the defendants’ market behavior, including 
the timing and synchronicity of their market conduct. These plus factors are 
best described as Cartel Markers, which are probative of collusion because 
their existence is consistent with underlying price fixing but generally 
 
 107 Leslie, supra note 63, at 12–13. 
 108 Id. at 13. 
 109 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel 
Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455, 476 (2011) (“However, side payments leave a paper trail that increases 
the likelihood of antitrust prosecution.”); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 394 (2011) (“Side payments are widely accepted as evidence of coordinated 
oligopolistic price elevation, for why else would a competitor make a payment to a rival for no 
consideration.”); Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated 
Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 164 (2002) (noting that side 
payments may “be difficult to negotiate and impossible to enforce given the risk that a prosecutor and 
court would infer an unlawful (even criminal) agreement to fix price”). 
 110 See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“There is evidence that defendants bought HFCS from one another even when the defendant doing the 
buying could have produced the amount bought at a lower cost than the purchase price.”). 
 111 See, e.g., id.; In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp. 
2d 141, 168 (D. Conn. 2009) (noting that without collusion, buybacks would be against the defendants’ 
self-interest); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 296 F. Supp. 2d 568, 579 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (listing sales 
between defendants as an indicator of collusion); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 261 F. 
Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff’s proof, which included evidence of 
buybacks, was enough to survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment). But see Valspar Corp. 
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 202 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff’s proof, 
which included evidence of buybacks, was not enough to survive the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment). For an explanation of why Valspar’s analysis of intercompetitor sales is deeply flawed, see 
Leslie, supra note 63, at 27–30. 
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incongruous with a competitive market. Courts consider several cartel 
markers as probative of collusion, including the number and timing of price 
increases, parallel price increases during periods of declining costs, 
maintenance of excess capacity during periods of rising prices, artificial 
standardization, major changes in business practices, and the stability of 
market shares among rivals. The first step in the traditional approach to 
proving price fixing through circumstantial evidence is showing conscious 
parallelism. 112  Although conscious parallelism is not itself a plus factor, 
several circumstances surrounding the defendants’ parallel conduct can 
constitute plus factors. 
Some of these circumstances surrounding the defendants’ parallel price 
increases involve the number or timing of such price hikes. For example, a 
large number of parallel price increases may be evidence of collusion.113 
Furthermore, when rivals’ price increases are close in time to each other, this 
may constitute “strong circumstantial evidence of an illegal agreement.”114 
The probative value of the opportunity-to-conspire plus factor, discussed 
above, increases when intercompetitor meetings are “followed shortly 
thereafter by parallel behavior that goes beyond what would be expected 
absent an agreement.”115 Similarly, when parallel price increases result in 
 
 112 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.  
 113 In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 825 (D. Md. 2013) (“The sheer 
number of parallel price increases, when coupled with the other evidence in this case, could lead a jury 
to reasonably infer a conspiracy.”); In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 555 F. Supp. 2d 934, 944 (E.D. Tenn. 
2008) (“It seems . . . only logical that the more individual instances of parallel conduct alleged by the 
plaintiffs, the stronger the inference that can be drawn from those acts of parallel conduct to support an 
illegal conspiracy and the less likely it is that these parallel acts occurred unilaterally without any 
conspiracy or agreement.”). 
 114 In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM), 681 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (“It is undisputed that 
the six lockstep price increases are strong circumstantial evidence of an illegal agreement to raise and/or 
maintain . . . prices.”); Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 899 F.3d 87, 104 (2d Cir. 2018) (“One 
powerful form of circumstantial evidence is parallel action—proof that defendants took identical actions 
within a time period suggestive of prearrangement.”); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 
1265 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[C]ontacts frequently occurred within days of a lockstep price-increase 
announcement. This proximity suggested that the price-increase announcements had been coordinated.” 
(citation omitted)); Tichy v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 376 F. Supp. 3d 821, 840–41 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (collecting 
cases); In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 750, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The nature of 
the pricing information transfer and the close temporal link between the transfer and announcement of 
the 2001 price increases raise an inference of conspiracy.”); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 
163 F. Supp. 3d 175, 197 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[O]pportunities to conspire may be probative of a conspiracy 
when meetings of Defendants are closely followed in time by suspicious actions or records.”). 
 115 Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 239 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 
(D.R.I. 2003); In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 800 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“[W]here 
Plaintiffs’ have alleged suspicious timing of important industry conferences in January 2008 and 2011, 
followed by unusual producer actions and market movements, those meetings plausibly help to fill-out 
the picture of Defendants’ alleged conspiratorial agreement.”); In re Domestic Drywall, 163 F. Supp. 3d 
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extraordinarily high profits, courts have found that extreme profitability may 
be evidence of collusion.116 
The market conditions in which parallel price increases occur are also 
important. Just as an increase in input costs can cause all firms to increase 
their prices in order to cover their higher expenses, a decrease in input costs 
should cause market prices for the finished product to also decline. So when 
prices across firms increase uniformly despite declining costs, this 
parallelism cannot be explained by the functioning of a competitive 
market.117 Thus, parallel price increases when costs are declining are a plus 
factor.118 Similarly, if the defendants are raising prices despite decreasing 
market demand for their products, those price hikes are more consistent with 
collusion than competition and are, thus, a plus factor.119 
 
at 197 (“[O]pportunities to conspire may be probative of a conspiracy when meetings of Defendants are 
closely followed in time by suspicious actions or records.”); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 
2d 1145, 1156 (D. Kan. 2012) (“Many . . . [intercompetitor] communications were by telephone calls 
placed after normal business hours and on weekends, including near the times of price increase 
announcements.”). 
 116 See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 572–73 (11th Cir. 1998); Estate 
of Le Baron v. Rohm & Haas Co., 441 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1971) (“[E]vidence of high profit margins 
is probative of the existence of a conspiracy.” (first citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 
781 (1946); and then citing Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 63 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1933))). 
 117 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent increases in marginal 
cost or demand, raising prices generally does not approximate—and cannot be mistaken as—competitive 
conduct.”); see also KAPLOW, supra note 57, at 257–58 (“Certain pricing patterns, such as sharp price 
increases unrelated to cost shocks . . . may be indicative of oligopolistic coordination rather than 
competitive behavior.”). Of course, if the defendants can prove a noncollusive reason for the parallel price 
increases, such as new regulatory burdens, that would diminish the probative value of this plus factor. 
 118 See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The complaint also 
alleges that in the face of steeply falling costs, the defendants increased their prices. This is anomalous 
behavior because falling costs increase a seller’s profit margin at the existing price, motivating him, in 
the absence of agreement, to reduce his price slightly in order to take business from his competitors, and 
certainly not to increase his price.”); Starr v. Sony BMG Music Ent., 592 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(finding a plus factor because defendants had not decreased prices despite “dramatic cost reductions”); 
Le Baron, 441 F.2d at 578 (“In American Tobacco Co., it was recognized that if competitors raise their 
prices during a period of declining costs and reap large profits as a result, and then reduce prices only 
when competition from others makes itself felt, that constituted probative evidence of a price-fixing 
conspiracy.” (citing Am. Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 804–06)); City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
429 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing American Tobacco Co.). 
 Because it generally entails rivals charging prices higher than costs to some consumers, persistent 
price discrimination may be evidence of collusion. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 
295 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Market-wide price discrimination is a symptom of price fixing when, 
as in this case, the product sold by the market is uniform.” (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs 
Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 1028, 1030–31 (7th Cir. 2002))). 
 119 See In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 (finding a plus factor because “reduced demand and excess 
supply are economic conditions that favor price cuts, rather than price increases”); In re Domestic 
Drywall, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (“For example, evidence that prices were raised despite no rise in demand 
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Relatedly, if two or more defendants are uniformly raising prices while 
simultaneously maintaining excess capacity or inventory on hand, that is 
evidence of collusion. 120  Instead of raising prices, a firm with surplus 
inventory in a competitive market would normally reduce its price in an 
effort to move its unsold goods. Similarly, if a firm has excess capacity, a 
rational firm would utilize its productive assets to grow its market share. A 
firm’s decision to preserve the stability of all firms’ market shares instead of 
increasing its own market share by using its available capacity to increase 
sales speaks to a preference for group wealth over its individual profitability. 
That is neither the conduct nor value judgment of a competitor and therefore 
constitutes a plus factor that is probative of a price-fixing agreement.121 
Another Cartel Marker factor involves efforts taken by firms to make 
their industry more susceptible to price collusion. As noted previously, 
product homogeneity is a plus factor indicating Cartel Susceptibility. Some 
products, such as some minerals, are naturally homogeneous. In other 
markets, products are uniform because they are standardized in order to 
facilitate interoperability, which is efficient and ultimately serves consumer 
interests. 122  If a product is standardized for legitimate reasons in a 
competitive market, then uniform prices may be less suspicious. 123  In 
 
or costs might indicate defendants are acting contrary to their interests.” (citing In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d 
at 359)). 
 120 See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 657 (“And the defendants had a lot of excess 
capacity, a condition that makes price competition more than usually risky and collusion more than 
usually attractive.”); In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (M.D. 
Pa. 2008) (“The allegations of observed conduct—actual forbearance from competition for customers, 
parallel price increases, and excess production capacity—are placed among other factual allegations that 
plausibly suggest a preceding agreement.”); see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 674 (3d ed. 1990) (“Price-fixing agreements . . . 
can also stimulate the wasteful accumulation of excess capacity.”). 
 121 Excess capacity may also be evidence of collusion because the maintenance of excess capacity 
serves as an enforcement mechanism and a visible threat against cheating by other members of the cartel.  
 122 Christopher R. Leslie, The DOJ’s Defense of Deception: Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting the 
Standard-Setting Process, 98 OR. L. REV. 379, 384–87 (2020). 
 123 See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 715 (1948) (“[The FTC] decided that even though 
competition might tend to drive the price of standardized products to a uniform level, such a tendency 
alone could not account for the almost perfect identity in prices, discounts, and cement containers which 
had prevailed for so long a time in the cement industry.”); Indep. Iron Works, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
322 F.2d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1963) (“Similarity of prices in the sale of standardized products such as the 
types of steel involved in this suit will not alone make out a prima facie case of collusive price fixing in 
violation of the Sherman Act, the reason being that competition will ordinarily cause one producer to 
charge about the same price that is charged by any other.” (first citing United States v. Int’l Harvester 
Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1927); and then citing Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass’n v. United States, 268 
U.S. 588 (1925))); Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 641 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Courts 
have noted that parallel pricing or conduct lacks probative significance when the product in question is 
standardized or fungible.”). 
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contrast, artificial standardization exists when firms standardize their 
products without a legitimate business justification; this is more probative of 
price fixing because it serves no pro-consumer purpose and can be used to 
strengthen an underlying price-fixing conspiracy.124 Courts thus distinguish 
between legitimate and artificial standardization125 and have long treated the 
latter as evidence of an underlying agreement to restrain competition126 and, 
therefore, as a plus factor.127 
Major changes in business practices are also circumstantial evidence of 
collusion, which can be categorized as a form of Cartel Marker. In the 1930s, 
the Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States128 famously 
recognized “a radical departure from the previous business practices of the 
industry” as powerful circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of a 
horizontal agreement to restrain trade.129 For example, the defendant movie 
studios in Interstate Circuit all simultaneously changed their policies 
regarding double features.130 A radical change in business practices is now a 
well-established plus factor.131 
 
 124 See KAPLOW, supra note 57, at 282–83 (“[S]tandardization facilitates coordination.”). 
 125 See, e.g., Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946) (“We think it is 
true that they were standardized in the instant situation, but this was the result of the activities of the 
Institute and its members.”). 
 126 See id. (noting that efforts on the part of the petitioner to standardize products supported finding 
that the petitioner’s “activities were the result of an agreement”).   
 127 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 143 (2d Cir. 1984); C-O-Two Fire 
Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952); see also Simons, supra note 41, at 628 
n.167 (“[A]rtificial standardization may indicate an attempt to form cartels.”). 
 128 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 
 129 Id. at 222. 
 130  Id. at 217 (noting that defendants agreed that so-called “A” films “shall never be exhibited in 
conjunction with another feature picture under the so-called policy of double features”). 
 131 See, e.g., United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“An abrupt shift 
from defendants’ past behavior and near-unanimity of action by several defendants may also strengthen 
the inference.”); In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (“[P]laintiffs’ allegations show that there was a marked change in defendants’ behavior in the 
market around the time the conspiracy allegedly started. . . . [I]f true, [this] would make an antitrust 
conspiracy plausible.”). In its largely pro-defendant Twombly decision, the Supreme Court recognized 
that “complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by 
multiple competitors, and made for no other discernible reasons, would support a plausible inference of 
conspiracy.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.4 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Although the Twombly Court was recognizing this principle as mutually conceded by the parties 
in the case, subsequent courts have embraced this language as a rule of law. See, e.g., In re Musical 
Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing the rule from Twombly 
but finding the behavior to be parallel conduct); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 
(7th Cir. 2010) (noting the language as an example of “parallel plus” behavior); Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l 
Paper, 276 F. Supp. 3d 811, 826 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (citing the rule from Twombly but finding there to be a 
lack of evidence for the unprecedented change in behavior), aff’d sub nom. Kleen Prods. LLC v. Georgia-
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1608 
A final Cartel Marker is the stability of relative market shares among 
the rival firms in a particular market. Stable market shares may indicate 
collusion because firms in truly competitive markets try to increase their 
market share. 132  In contrast, cartel members frequently fix production 
quotas133 and negotiate their relative market shares as part of their price-
fixing conspiracy.134 Allocating market shares in conjunction with fixing 
prices gives members more certainty about their expected cartel profits and 
reduces cartel members’ incentives to cheat on the cartel by reducing price 
because even if the cheater gets more sales by charging less than the cartel 
price, it will still have to compensate its cartel partners for selling more than 
its cartel allotment.135 Empirically, many historical cartels have fixed and 
allocated market shares as part of their price-fixing operations.136 Because 
cartels use market allocation as a mechanism to distribute profits and reduce 
the risk of cheating, stable market shares are an indicator of cartelization.137 
Consequently, courts have recognized that stable market shares represent a 
plus factor.138  
 
Pac. LLC, 910 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2018); Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 804 F. Supp. 
2d 419, 425 n.4 (D. Md. 2011) (noting the language as an example of “parallel plus” behavior). 
 132 See Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 210 (3d Cir. 2017) (Stengel, 
J., dissenting). 
 133 ERVIN HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 76 (1945).  
 134 Leslie, supra note 28, at 556. 
 135 MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 80, at 121–22 (discussing “the role of a market share allocation 
in deterring secret deviations”); Leslie, supra note 63, at 12. 
 136 See HEXNER, supra note 133, at 77 (“Many cartel agreements are based on determined marketing 
shares of participants.”); see also Joel M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Social Status, Entry and 
Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 41, 51 (1999) (noting 
how British shipping cartels would “allocate market shares of specific types of goods”); JOHN E. STEALEY 
III, THE ANTEBELLUM KANAWHA SALT BUSINESS AND WESTERN MARKETS 84 (1993) (discussing the 
Kanawha salt cartel). 
 137 CONNOR, supra note 50, at 29 (“Faithful members of a cartel can use changes in market shares as 
indicators of cheating more easily than trying to verify allegations of price discounts to particular 
buyers.”); Kovacic et al., supra note 1, at 413 (“If an effective cartel uses a market share allocation 
scheme, then we will observe fixed relative market shares among those firms.”). 
 138 See, e.g., White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 581–82 (1st Cir. 2011) (treating “stable 
market” as a plus factor); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“[T]he market shares of the defendants changed very little during the period of the alleged 
conspiracy, which is just what one would expect of a group of sellers who are all charging the same prices 
for a uniform product and trying to keep everyone happy by maintaining the relative sales positions of 
the group’s members.”); In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. Cheese Antitrust Litig., No. 9 CR 3690, 2013 
WL 212908, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“Unusual and sustained pricing stability is not expected in a 
competitive market and, as a ‘plus factor,’ can indicate collusion.” (citing In re TFT–LCD (Flat Panel) 
Antitrust Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2008))); Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 210 (3d Cir. 2017) (Stengel, J., dissenting) (“Market share stability is a 
well-recognized symptom of collusive and concerted action in antitrust cases.”); see also City of 
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Even when a cartel agreement does not specifically fix each member’s 
market share, “[c]ooperative social norms generally prevent competitors 
from engaging in destructive acts in order to gain market share.”139 The 
Seventh Circuit has explained that stable market shares are circumstantial 
evidence of an underlying price-fixing agreement because “inflexibility of 
the market leaders’ market shares over time[] suggest[s] a possible 
agreement among them not to alter prices, since such an alteration would 
tend to cause market shares to change.”140 When market shares that used to 
vary become stabilized, that may indicate that a price-fixing conspiracy has 
taken root.141 Because firms often maintain their relative market shares by 
declining sales after they have reached their cartel quota, it is suspicious 
when a firm foregoes a profitable sale—and this behavior constitutes a plus 
factor.142 
Several of these Cartel Markers may operate in tandem to create a 
stronger basis for inferring collusion. For example, in a market with uniform 
price increases, the stability of market shares over time is even more 
suspicious when demand is decreasing or excess capacity is maintained, 
because these events would usually cause a readjustment of relative market 
shares in a competitive market. 143  When market fluctuations result in 
decreased demand but price continues to rise uniformly and market shares 
among defendants remain steady, nonmarket forces may be playing a role in 
setting the price.144 The most likely nonmarket force is often collusion. 
F. Suspicious Statements and Silences 
Not all plus factors in price-fixing cases concern cartel mechanics and 
market behavior. One potentially potent form of circumstantial evidence 
 
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 570–72 (11th Cir. 1998) (treating high incumbency 
rate on contracts as a plus factor). 
 139 Leslie, supra note 28, at 586. 
 140 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 141 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 659–60 (“If . . . the gyrations [of market shares] 
moderated during the period of the alleged conspiracy, this would be evidence for the plaintiffs.”); see 
also KAPLOW, supra note 57, at 264–65 (noting “[t]he reasonably familiar point . . . that coordinated 
oligopoly prices, and perhaps also market shares, tend to be stickier over time than those of competitors”).  
 142 See, e.g., Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that a 
refusal to enter into profitable sales can “support an inference of concerted action”); see also CONNOR, 
supra note 50, at 321 (noting how the vitamin cartel was exposed because vitamin buyers reported 
suppliers refusing to give price quotes). 
 143 See MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 80, at 228–29 (“[M]arket share, geographic, and/or customer 
stability in conjunction with excess capacity in the industry and prices and profits that are relatively high 
and increasing constitute a constellation of factors that are jointly a super-plus factor.”). 
 144 Id.; see infra Part III. 
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involves price-fixing defendants’ statements during the period of the alleged 
conspiracy and when the defendants were accused of illegal collusion.145 In 
many cases, plaintiffs present evidence in the form of incriminating emails 
authored by the alleged price fixers or people with inside knowledge of 
collusion. 146  These messages often contain language that seems to 
acknowledge participation in price fixing but may nonetheless require a 
degree of interpretation that leads courts to categorize the emails as 
circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence.147 For example, in In re 
Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 148  the plaintiffs introduced several 
incriminating emails discussing industry price increases as well as a letter 
from one executive who memorialized his meeting with a competitor at a 
trade fair, noting that the latter “assured me that they were fully supportive 
of the price increase proposition.”149 Even when these emails fall short of 
direct evidence, they remain strong circumstantial evidence of concerted 
action. 
Complaints about a rival’s price-cutting activity also constitute a plus 
factor related to suspicious communications. 150  In a competitive market, 
firms do not complain to their rivals about price cuts and beseech them to 
raise prices; rather, they meet the competitive price or find a way to engage 
in nonprice competition by improving their customer service or product 
quality. Consequently, it is a plus factor for a firm to apologize to its rivals 
 
 145  In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 662 (noting statement from one price-fixing 
defendant that “[w]e have an understanding within the industry not to undercut each other’s prices” served 
as evidence of “an explicit agreement to fix prices”).  
 146 See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 208 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(Stengel, J., dissenting) (noting that an email from one price-fixing defendant “recognized that ‘all are 
still acting in a disciplined manner, respecting each other’s market positions and share and holding 
price.”); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing an email in 
which defendant’s employee described industry price increases as collusive); cf. In re Wholesale Grocery 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 752 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing incriminating emails in a market 
division conspiracy case).  
 147  In some instances, these judicial characterizations are suspect. See Christopher R. Leslie, 
Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 316–18 (2010) (discussing In re Baby Food). 
 148 385 F.3d 350, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 149 Id. at 366. 
 150 See, e.g., In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 985, 994–95 (N.D. Ohio 
2015); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 126 (4th ed. 2017) (noting that intercompetitor “complaints, 
apologies, and express solicitations are all highly suspicious”); see also id. at 122–23 (“[W]hen a 
competitor merely complains to its rival about the latter’s ‘low price’ . . . the ‘objective’ meaning of such 
a statement to the reasonable observer seems clear: the only business rationale for complaining is to 
induce a higher price.”). 
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for reducing price or taking sales151 or for an executive to berate a subordinate 
for attempting to take business away from a competitor.152 Such conduct 
makes little sense unless the competitors are colluding.153 
Another type of Suspicious Statement that verges on acknowledgement 
of wrongdoing is the assertion of pretextual explanations for parallel 
behavior or other cartel-related conduct.154 When defendants lie about why 
they raised price at the same time, this is circumstantial evidence of collusion 
because law-abiding firms have no reason to lie.155  As one district court 
recently explained, “Evidence of pretextual explanations for price increases 
or output restrictions, ‘if believed by a jury, would disprove the likelihood 
of independent action’ by an alleged conspirator.”156 
The flip side of suspicious statements is suspicious silences. These, too, 
can be a plus factor. The Supreme Court has recognized that defendants’ 
failure to offer any explanation for their parallel conduct is itself 
circumstantial evidence of collusion. 157  Likewise, a refusal to answer 
 
 151 See, e.g., Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1045 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (noting how an employee of one price-fixing defendant “took 
advantage of a trade meeting to apologize to [a rival firm’s vice president] about a low bid [the employee’s 
firm] had made by mistake”). 
 152 See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D. Kan. 2012) (noting how 
executive “of Bayer berated subordinates about their attempt to take some business away from their 
competitor BASF”). 
 153 See CONNOR, supra note 50, at 293 (noting complaints among coconspirators in the vitamin B2 
cartel). 
 154 See, e.g., Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that 
pretextual explanations supported an inference that the defendant was acting in concert with its 
competitors to boycott the plaintiff); JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 779 
(7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the defendant’s refusal to sell to the plaintiff on the grounds of the 
plaintiff’s credit risk was pretextual since the plaintiff offered to pay in cash); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. 
Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 821 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a hospital’s reasons for terminating a physician 
could be pretextual if “no reasonable medical practitioner, considering the same set of facts, could have 
reached those conclusions”); White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 585 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[S]uch 
pretext, standing alone[,] is not sufficient to show joint action, but can only strengthen an inference of 
joint action that is otherwise in evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Urethane, 913 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1163–64 (finding that the pretextual statements concerning the defendants’ decision to 
increase the price of its products “goes beyond mere silence or nondisclosure”).  
 155  See Leslie, supra note 4 (manuscript at 26) (discussing how price-fixing conspirators lie about 
the reasons for their price hikes in an effort to conceal their illegal collusion). 
 156 In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 750, 774 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Fragale 
& Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 157  Interstate Cir. Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225–26 (1939) (“The failure under the 
circumstances to call as witnesses those officers . . . [to explain] whether they had acted in pursuance of 
agreement is itself persuasive that their testimony, if given, would have been unfavorable to appellants.”); 
see also Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *14 
(4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “forgotten” conversations about important subjects constitute evidence 
of conspiracy); In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures & Options Trading Litig., 328 F. Supp. 3d 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1612 
questions about one’s suspicious conduct may constitute a plus factor.158 
Competitors not engaging in collusion can generally explain why they raised 
prices or undertook other seemingly irregular conduct. The refusal or 
inability to do so is suspect. 
Finally, related to pretextual explanations and refusals to answer 
questions, the efforts that price-fixing defendants take to conceal their 
communications and other interactions with their competitors are a separate 
plus factor.159 Price-fixing conspirators traditionally employ a wide variety 
of concealment tactics, including using false names, code words, secret 
meetings, and falsified documents.160 Executives with nothing to hide likely 
would not take extreme measures to conceal their communications and 
relationships.161 
This category’s plus factors are particularly probative because they 
come close to defendants acknowledging that they are doing something 
nefarious. Even when these communications, acts of deception, and 
concealments fall short of an outright admission of price fixing, they make 
little sense in the absence of collusion and, thus, constitute important plus 
factors, supporting an inference of collusion. 
 
217, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Information sharing among competitors without a legitimate purpose is also 
good evidence of a conspiracy.”); Cason–Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 862 F. Supp. 2d 603, 631 (E.D. 
Mich. 2012) (“Certainly, it is telling that when Plaintiffs and their counsel invited various employees of 
the Defendant hospitals to suggest a pro-competitive justification for their exchange of information with 
their counterparts at other Detroit-area hospitals, none was able to do so.”); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION 109 (2d ed. 2003) (“Because contacts among competitors present a definite danger to 
competition, it is reasonable as a policy matter to require the companies that are meeting to explain their 
actions. When an innocent explanation is not forthcoming or is not plausible, the suspicion arises that the 
contact was made in furtherance of a conspiracy to suppress competition.”); Kovacic et al., supra note 1, 
at 406 (explaining that “[t]he absence of a plausible, legitimate business rationale for suspicious conduct 
(such as certain communications with rivals) or the presentation of contrived rationales for certain 
conduct” is a plus factor). 
 158 See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 159 See In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing “unusual 
steps” to conceal conversations with competitors such as using “pay telephones instead of calling from 
[the] office” and using “a prepaid phone card” as well as meeting “with competitors at off-site locations, 
such as coffee shops or hotels”); In re Blood Reagents, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 777 (“[Defendant’s] efforts to 
conceal [an intercompetitor meeting] . . . raises an inference of conspiracy.”); In re Ethylene Propylene 
Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141, 176 (D. Conn. 2009) (“Here, the 
plaintiffs’ evidence of the frequent and friendly communications between the defendants and the secrecy 
of their meetings is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer that the defendants participated in an 
unlawful price-fixing conspiracy.”). 
 160 Leslie, supra note 4 (manuscript at 8–12, 52). 
 161 See In re Urethane, 768 F.3d at 1264–65. 
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G. Multipurpose Plus Factors 
Some plus factors transcend easy classification because they fall into 
several of the above categories. For example, as discussed previously, 
intercompetitor communications are relevant to Cartel Formation, Cartel 
Management, and Cartel Enforcement. After all, it would be difficult to 
monitor cartel members and penalize cheaters without the conspirators 
communicating with each other. That makes intercompetitor 
communications a particularly probative plus factor. 
Several other plus factors not yet discussed also serve multiple 
functions within a price-fixing conspiracy. To pigeonhole them into one 
category would deprive them of their full probative value. This Section 
highlights four such Multipurpose Plus Factors: prior cartel participation, 
foreign price-fixing activities, actions against independent interest, and 
evidence of a traditional conspiracy. 
1. Prior Cartel Participation 
Perhaps one of the best indicators of whether firms in a particular 
market will engage in illegal collusion is whether they have fixed prices in 
the past. In their large study of cartel creation, Professors Margaret 
Levenstein and Valerie Suslow explained that “one of the most clearly 
established stylized facts is that cartels form, endure for a period, appear to 
break down, and then re-form again.”162 Several major industries have long 
histories of price-fixing recidivism.163 
Prior price-fixing activity by the same—or similar—configuration of 
defendants in a particular market establishes several individual plus factors. 
For example, antitrust recidivism shows that the defendants trade in a 
product that is amenable to cartelization and also participate in a market 
structure that lends itself to collusion.164 This reinforces plus factors related 
to Cartel Susceptibility. 165  Furthermore, prior price collusion shows that 
defendants have a motive to engage in price fixing as well as a willingness 
 
 162 Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 34, at 54; see also Leslie, supra note 28, at 593 (“Cartels appear 
easier to construct when an industry has some history of collusion.” (citing examples)). 
 163 See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 
38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 567–68 (2007) (“Besides fluid milk and dairy products, other industries such 
as gypsum board, bread, cement, fertilizers, trucking, and lumber have had a higher degree of 
recidivism.”); see also Hay & Kelley, supra note 33, at 28 (“Corollary evidence is that industries 
colluding at one point in time often can be found to be colluding at later points in time, in spite of Antitrust 
action in the interim.”). 
 164 POSNER, supra note 26, at 79 (“A ‘record’ of price fixing or related antitrust violations is some 
evidence, therefore, that the structure of the market is favorable to collusion.”).  
 165 For examples of Cartel Susceptibility plus factors, see supra notes 31–47 and accompanying text. 
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to violate antitrust laws. 166  Previous collusive activity proves that these 
putative rivals have overcome the difficulties of Cartel Formation and Cartel 
Management, often including the implementation of a cartel-enforcement 
regime. Moreover, cartel experience allows rival firms to overcome the trust 
barriers to collusion.167 Indeed, some cartel initiators tout their prior price-
fixing activities as a calling card to convince their rivals—and would-be 
coconspirators—that they are sufficiently trustworthy to conspire with.168 
Finally, conspirators learn from their prior price-fixing experience and adjust 
their strategies to create even more stable cartels moving forward.169 Given 
these dynamics, some courts sensibly treat prior price-fixing activities as a 
plus factor.170 
2. Foreign Price-Fixing Activity 
In addition to the defendants’ prior collusion in the same market, their 
price-fixing activities in other markets, such as foreign markets, can 
constitute an important Multipurpose Plus Factor. Federal judges have 
reasoned that “[e]vidence of cooperation between Defendants in foreign 
price-fixing, through a trade association or otherwise, would certainly be 
relevant to establish the existence of an illegal combination or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade” in the American market.171 
The defendants’ participation in price-fixing activities in other 
countries is strong evidence supporting an inference of price fixing in the 
 
 166  See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Evidence of 
‘[p]rior antitrust violations and the history of competition in a market’ may be used to show the ‘intent, 
motive and method of a conspiracy under Section 1’ so long as there is a ‘direct, logical relationship’ 
between the collateral conspiracy and the instant conspiracy.” (quoting U.S. Football League v. Nat’l 
Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1371 (2d Cir. 1988))), aff’d sub nom. Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. 
App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 167 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing the role of trust in price-fixing cartels). 
 168 Leslie, supra note 28, at 593. 
 169 Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 29, at 27 (“[C]artels reappear in some industries, and cartel 
duration tends to increase with industry experience with collusion . . . .”); Leslie, supra note 28, at 595–
96 (“[C]artel members can learn from their prior experience. This includes learning how to meet, 
coordinate, enforce, and trust.”). 
 170 See, e.g., In re Pool Prods. Distrib. Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. La. 2013) 
(listing “involvement in other conspiracies” as a plus factor); In re Static Random Access Memory 
(SRAM) Antitrust Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating guilty pleas of price fixing 
in the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) market “support an inference of a conspiracy in the 
SRAM industry” when some of the same actors “were responsible for marketing both SRAM and 
DRAM”); see also In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 913 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(Merritt, J., dissenting) (“Having proposed to fall in line behind one another before strongly suggests that 
the airlines would do it again.”). 
 171 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
29, 2004). 
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American market for several reasons. As an initial matter, foreign collusion 
helps establish the level of trust necessary for firms to fix prices in the 
American market.172 Because price fixing is criminal conduct that can result 
in ten years’ imprisonment,173 executives are unlikely to collude unless a 
minimal level of trust exists. Trust among natural adversaries is not organic, 
however, and rival firms may need to develop trust over time.174 Foreign 
markets in nations with either weak competition laws—or weak enforcement 
of nominally strong competition laws—can provide a testing ground for 
aspiring price-fixing conspiracies. Cartel ringleaders can also develop a 
reputation for trustworthiness by cooperating in foreign markets and then 
harness that reputation in order to cartelize the U.S. market.175 Empirically, 
cartels often start small and then expand geographically and across product 
lines.176 
Furthermore, foreign experience is highly relevant to the plus-factor 
categories of Cartel Formation, Cartel Management, and Cartel 
Enforcement. Evidence of foreign price fixing shows that competing firms 
have solved the coordination problems that can hobble efforts to initiate a 
price-fixing scheme in the United States.177 Fixing prices in foreign markets 
also gives cartels the opportunity to perfect their enforcement mechanisms 
for detecting and punishing firms that cheat on the cartel.178 
 
 172 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of trust for cartel 
formation and maintenance). 
 173 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 174 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 134–35 (1960) (“Trust is often achieved 
simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and the recognition by each that what he might 
gain by cheating in a given instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes possible 
a long sequence of future agreement.”); Christopher R. Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 
67 DUKE L.J. 557, 580–84 (2017); Leslie, supra note 28, at 591 (“The history of the chemical cartels 
shows how partners grow to trust each other through incremental demonstrations of trust . . . .”). 
 175  Leslie, supra note 174, at 582 (explaining that cartel ringleaders “use their foreign cartel 
experience as a calling card to convince potential cartel partners in new product and geographic markets 
that they are trustworthy”). 
 176  See, e.g., id. at 580; Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organization of 
Conspiracy: Illegal Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry, 58 AM. SOCIO. REV. 837, 838 
(1993) (explaining how the 1950s heavy equipment cartel expanded from a few product lines to twenty); 
Leslie, supra note 28, at 590–94 (discussing expansion of various chemical cartels into new product 
lines). 
 177  Leslie, supra note 174, at 584 (“Launching an international cartel requires significant 
coordination among rival firms that come from different corporate cultures, often speak different 
languages, and may be generally reluctant to cooperate with their competitors.”). See generally 
Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 62, at 825–34 (explaining the different points of coordination a cartel 
may consider). 
 178 Leslie, supra note 174, at 593. See generally Leslie, supra note 28, at 610–22 (discussing the 
different monitoring and enforcement mechanisms a cartel may use). 
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With respect to motive, which is its own plus factor, defendants’ price 
fixing in foreign markets also provides a strong incentive for firms to expand 
their collusion into the American marketplace. Doing so would increase their 
cartel profits179 and reduce the risk of cartel-destabilizing arbitrage whereby 
arbitrageurs purchase products in the U.S. market at competitive prices and 
then undercut the price fixers’ relatively high prices in cartelized foreign 
markets.180 Regional cartels generally expand globally in order to prevent 
arbitrage.181 
In sum, if defendants have conspired to fix prices in foreign 
jurisdictions, that is strong circumstantial evidence that parallel pricing by 
the same companies in the American marketplace may be the product of a 
corresponding domestic price-fixing conspiracy. In addition to being a plus 
factor unto itself, the existence of a foreign price-fixing conspiracy proves 
the presence of other plus factors, including the motive to fix prices (to 
increase cartel profits and reduce arbitrage), opportunity to conspire, 182 
intercompetitor communications, 183  and that the relevant product-market 
structure is conducive to collusion. 184  The fact that competing firms are 
fixing prices in foreign markets increases the probability that they are also 
 
 179 Leslie, supra note 174, at 587. 
 180  Grant Butler, The Supreme Court’s Destruction of Incentive to Participate in the Justice 
Department’s Cartel Leniency Program, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 169, 180 (2005) (“If a cartel chose to fix 
prices only in foreign countries, arbitrageurs can purchase the goods in the United States at the 
competitive market price and take them to a foreign country where the goods could be sold at a price 
higher than the competitive price but lower than the fixed price of the cartel.”); see also John M. Connor 
& Darren Bush, How to Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing: Using Extraterritorial Application of 
the Antitrust Laws as a Deterrence Mechanism, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 813, 835 (2008) (“Arbitrage 
undermines the ability of international cartels to set prices at the most profitable level in each currency 
zone and could even destroy collusive arrangements.”). 
 181 See Butler, supra note 180, at 180 (“Price fixing cartels selling global goods must operate in all 
markets to avoid arbitrage.”); Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. 
Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 275 (2005) (“Accordingly, the vitamin 
conspirators were obliged to cartelize globally: that is, to bring into the cartel enough of the worldwide 
supply that the supracompetitive price is defensible against arbitrage.”); see also Leslie, supra note 174, 
at 587–88 (explaining why foreign cartels expand into the American market in order to deter foreign 
consumers from purchasing lower-priced American goods and to prevent price disparities from alerting 
competition authorities to price fixing in the markets with elevated prices). 
 182 See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 29, 2004) (“Evidence of foreign price-fixing among Defendants would also be material to prove that 
they had the opportunity . . . to engage in domestic price-fixing . . . .”). 
 183 Leslie, supra note 174, at 595. 
 184 See In re Auto. Refinishing, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 (“Evidence of foreign price-fixing among 
Defendants would also be material to prove that they had the . . . ability to engage in domestic price-
fixing for automotive refinishing paint.”). 
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fixing the prices for American consumers. 185  Consequently, this is an 
important plus factor.186 
3. Actions Against Independent Interests 
Another Multipurpose Plus Factor is whether the defendants have taken 
actions that would be against their independent economic interests unless a 
conspiracy is afoot. The Third Circuit has explained that “evidence of actions 
against self-interest means there is evidence of behavior inconsistent with a 
competitive market.”187 The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] showing that the 
defendants’ actions, taken independently, would be contrary to their 
economic self-interest will ordinarily ‘tend to exclude the likelihood of 
independent conduct.’”188 Such conduct is a plus factor.189 
Examples of actions against independent interests abound in antitrust 
case law and populate several of the plus-factor categories. Some courts 
recognize that suspicious pricing activity, such as certain Cartel Markers, can 
represent an action against interest.190 Courts have held that “sacrific[ing] 
profitable production” makes little sense “absent coordination and 
agreement” among the producers and, thus, constitutes important 
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy. 191  Similarly, maintaining a price-
verification system—which is a form of cartel monitoring—can be against 
an individual firm’s self-interest because “confessing price-cutting to 
competitors makes no economic sense for independent actors, but makes 
perfect economic sense for cartel members.” 192  Other actions against 
 
 185 Leslie, supra note 174, at 586–87 (“If the major firms in an industry are fixing prices in one 
market, this increases the likelihood that the same firms are engaging in price fixing in another market.”). 
 186 See id. at 591–96.  
 187 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 188 Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462, 475 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 189 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(“Evidence that defendants have acted against their economic interest can also constitute a plus factor.”). 
 190 In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 750, 773 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The Court 
concludes that all of the price increases were actions contrary to Ortho’s interest.”); Fleischman v. Albany 
Med. Ctr., 728 F. Supp. 2d 130, 162 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The fact that but-for a wage agreement, 
[d]efendants would be acting against economic self interest is persuasive evidence that [d]efendants did 
not act independently.”); In re Propranolol Antitrust Litig., 249 F. Supp. 3d 712, 721 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (“[N]o company ‘in its right mind’ would raise prices by as much as 1,700% relying on nothing 
but industry data that the company itself claims is flawed (the present situation).”); see also Starr v. Sony 
BMG Music Ent., 592 F.3d 314, 327 (2d Cir. 2010) (“For example, it would not be in each individual 
defendant’s self-interest to sell Internet Music at prices, and with DRMs, that were so unpopular as to 
ensure that ‘nobody in their right mind’ would want to purchase the music, unless the defendant’s rivals 
were doing the same.”).  
 191 Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal, 639 F. Supp. 2d 877, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 192 Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1047 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
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individual interest relate to cartel penalty mechanisms. For example, if a firm 
decides to purchase products from a rival even when it has excess capacity 
and could make the product for less than the intercompetitor transaction 
price, this behavior is both an action against individual interest and a 
separately recognized plus factor.193 Not only is the transaction against the 
individual interest of the purchaser, it may constitute an action against the 
individual interest of the seller, who would have been better served if it tried 
to steal customers away from its rival instead of providing stock that the rival 
can sell to those same customers.194 In short, depending on the action against 
self-interest at issue, this type of plus factor can fall into several different 
categories. 
4. Evidence of Traditional Conspiracy 
Finally, another plus factor that is difficult to assign to a single category 
is “evidence . . . [of] traditional conspiracy.” 195  Although some courts 
describe traditional conspiracy evidence as “the most important plus 
factor,”196 this plus factor is actually a bundle of plus factors, including “a 
high level of interfirm communications,”197 “proof that the defendants got 
together and exchanged assurances of common action or otherwise adopted 
a common plan,”198  and “noneconomic evidence that there was an actual 
manifest agreement not to compete.” 199  This plus factor is multipurpose 
because it can show Cartel Formation, Cartel Management, and Cartel 
Enforcement. 
H. Outside the Typology 
This typology is not exhaustive. Some forms of circumstantial evidence 
do not fit neatly into any category. For example, several courts have treated 
government investigations into defendants’ potential collusion as a plus 
 
 193 See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
 194 See Leslie, supra note 63, at 39–40. 
 195  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 321–22 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing “evidence implying a traditional 
conspiracy” as a plus factor)). 
 196 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 401 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 197 In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141, 166–67 
(D. Conn. 2009). 
 198 K & S Assocs. v. Am. Ass’n of Physicists in Med., No. 3:09–1108, 2013 WL 2177938, at *15 
(M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2013) (citing Burtch, 662 F.3d at 227). 
 199 In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 822 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting In re 
Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
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factor,200 although the significance of such investigation depends largely on 
the findings and context of the investigation. Similarly, the testimony or 
reports of expert witnesses can serve as important circumstantial evidence of 
collusion because economists and scholars who have studied price-fixing 
activity can better interpret the factual record and draw informed 
conclusions.201 Neither of these types of circumstantial evidence lends itself 
to easy classification. Furthermore, because antitrust law is common law, 
federal courts can recognize new plus factors as the facts of future cases 
dictate.202 
III. PROBATIVE SYNERGY 
Having a typology of plus factors allows judges and juries to better 
appreciate why certain facts or actions are probative of price fixing. 
Presenting plus factors in these categories also illustrates the relationships 
among the various plus factors. This is important because no single plus 
factor exists in a vacuum: each piece of evidence must be evaluated in 
relation to the surrounding pieces of circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, 
some plus factors may be particularly significant because they serve multiple 
functions.203 Finally, and importantly for our purposes, the above typology 
provides the necessary context for understanding the errors that courts make 
when applying the plus-factor framework, as explored in Part IV. 
The typology also lays the foundation for the principle of probative 
synergy. Probative synergy explains why plus-factor analysis in antitrust 
cases is not arithmetic. Judges do not merely add up how many plus factors 
 
 200 See e.g., Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP W. Coast Prods. LLC, 324 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1148 (S.D. Cal. 
2018); In re Generic Pharm. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 404, 452 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Hinds 
County v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 201 See, e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 565 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that an economic expert’s “data and testimony need not prove the plaintiffs’ case by themselves; they 
must merely constitute one piece of the puzzle that the plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the jury”); 
In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D. Kan. 2012) (denying price-fixing 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment based, in part, on expert evidence that the defendants were 
charging supracompetitive prices); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1355 
(N.D. Ga. 2000) (noting the probative value of expert testimony that “the climate of the polypropylene 
market during the relevant time period was consistent with a finding that Defendants engaged in a 
conspiracy to fix prices”).  
 202 In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2017) 
(“There is no finite list of potential plus factors.”), aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 714 F. 
App’x 986 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 203  See supra notes 162–199 and accompanying text. Some plus factors are so important that 
Professors Kovacic, Marshall, Marx, and White refer to them as “super plus factors.” Kovacic et al., supra 
note 1, at 396–97. 
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an antitrust plaintiff has pled or presented evidence for.204 Addition is an 
inappropriate mathematical operation in this analysis because each plus 
factor can increase the probative value of the surrounding plus factors, such 
that one plus factor added to one plus factor added to one plus factor does 
not necessarily equal a probative value of three, but could equal a probative 
value of four or five or more. The probative value of any one plus factor is 
not fixed but can grow when viewed in the context of a bundle of plus factors. 
This is the essence of probative synergy. 
While this Article is the first to introduce the phrase and the concept of 
probative synergy, it is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s antitrust 
jurisprudence. Probative synergy operationalizes the Supreme Court’s 
mandate in Continental Ore that courts not isolate an antitrust plaintiff’s 
proffer of proof and not examine each piece of evidence in isolation. The 
most appropriate way to “look[] at [the plaintiff’s evidence] as a whole,”205 
as required by Continental Ore, is to examine the proffered plus factors in 
relation to each other.206 Even plus factors that might seem insignificant or 
irrelevant on their own can be extremely probative when viewed in context 
with other plus factors present in the case.207 
Some combinations of plus factors are especially powerful. Pleading or 
proffering evidence of plus factors across the different categories in the plus-
factor typology can significantly increase the plausibility of a price-fixing 
claim. For example, Cartel Susceptibility plus factors demonstrate a market’s 
propensity to cartelization, which is important circumstantial evidence of 
collusion. When some of those plus factors are coupled with plus factors 
relevant to Cartel Formation and/or Cartel Management, the plaintiff’s 
proffer of circumstantial evidence becomes much more persuasive. For 
instance, intercompetitor communications—particularly invitations to 
 
 204 Courts do not prescribe a minimum number of plus factors that a plaintiff must present. See In re 
Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 n.12. 
 205 Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698–99 (1962) (quoting United 
States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913)). 
 206 See In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d 3 at 369 (“A court must look to the evidence as a whole and 
consider any single piece of evidence in the context of other evidence.”). 
 In some ways, the Supreme Court’s largely pro-defendant opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
contained dicta that recognized the concept of probative synergy in theory, when the majority noted that 
“complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by 
multiple competitors, and made for no other discernible reason, would support a plausible inference of 
conspiracy.” 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.4 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This language suggests an 
acknowledgement that this particular bundle of plus factors, operating together, is sufficient. 
 207 See SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 425 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Actions that might 
seem otherwise neutral in isolation can take on a different shape when considered in conjunction with 
other surrounding circumstances.”). 
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collude or exchanges of price and sales data—are even more suspicious in a 
market that is prone to cartelization. Although some judges treat parallel 
pricing in concentrated markets as a natural (noncollusive) phenomenon,208 
when this is accompanied by highly questionable communications, a 
reasonable jury could infer that the parallel price hikes are the product of 
collusion, not coincidence or independent decisions. 
Proof of intercompetitor communications on its own is valuable 
circumstantial evidence, but many additional plus factors increase the 
probative value of that evidence. 209  For example, intercompetitor 
communications are far more probative of price fixing when the individuals 
involved took efforts to conceal their meetings, including their frequency 
and/or contents. Rival firms that are not breaking any laws generally do not 
affirmatively obscure their activities. 210  Evidence of parallel pricing plus 
intercompetitor meetings plus suspicious timing plus concealment creates a 
powerful inference of collusion. 
Similarly, the probative value of any one or more Cartel Markers is 
significantly magnified when coupled with any acknowledgement-related 
plus factors. Firms should be able to truthfully explain why they raised their 
price even though their costs and/or demand were decreasing, or why they 
declined to expand output or increase their market share despite the fact that 
they had excess supply or unused capacity. Such suspicious business 
decisions are significantly more likely to be strong evidence of collusion 
when defendants lie about their reasons for undertaking parallel conduct that 
is more consistent with collusion than competition. Likewise, a refusal to 
provide any explanation for parallel behavior is significantly more probative 
than that behavior alone because if the conduct were truly independent, 
executives should be able to recount their decision-making process, 
including by offering internal reports and testimony from the individuals 
involved. 
A plaintiff’s ability to plead or proffer plus factors across a range of 
categories can increase the strength of the case significantly, but showing 
multiple plus factors within a single category can also magnify the probative 
 
 208 See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1042–43 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
 209 See KAPLOW, supra note 57, at 304 (“Interfirm communications of all sorts can be important in 
making reliable inferences. It is also clear that their reliability may be enhanced, perhaps significantly in 
many instances, by combining them with the other evidence considered throughout.”); see, e.g., In re 
Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 750, 776–78 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The Court agrees with 
plaintiffs that the nature of the communications, including a direct transfer of pricing information, and 
the communications’ temporal proximity to the 2001 price increase raises an inference of conspiracy.”). 
 210  See Leslie, supra note 4 (manuscript at 53). 
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value of each of those plus factors.211 For example, the Cartel Enforcement 
category encompasses two separate types of enforcement behavior: 
monitoring and penalty. If a plaintiff proffers evidence of monitoring (such 
as price verifications) and of penalties (such as intercompetitor sales), then 
the plaintiff has presented evidence of a complete cartel-enforcement system. 
Evidence of cartel monitoring is significantly more probative when it is 
accompanied by corresponding evidence of cartel penalties or mechanisms 
to balance the cartel’s book in order to restore market shares.212 Evidence of 
cartel monitoring increases the probative value of evidence of cartel 
punishment, and vice versa. The likelihood that competitors would 
innocently engage in both monitoring and punishing activities is far less than 
the likelihood that they would innocently engage in only one of those types 
of activities.213 
The typology presented in Part II reviewed dozens of recognized plus 
factors, which means there are billions of permutations of plus-factor 
packages that a plaintiff could present. Each grouping of plus factors tells a 
different story. Antitrust plaintiffs should invest effort in explaining to 
judges how their proffered plus factors interact with one another. Each 
additional plus factor provides an opportunity for antitrust plaintiffs to 
provide a comprehensive explanation for why this particular combination of 
plus factors constitutes strong circumstantial evidence of collusion. 
The insights from the concept of probative synergy also inform the way 
that judges approach pretrial motions. Judges should not dismiss price-fixing 
claims when a plaintiff pleads several plus factors, at least not without 
considering the potential probative synergy when those plus factors are 
combined.214 Similarly, in the context of summary judgment motions, if the 
plaintiff proffers evidence of several plus factors across multiple categories, 
then courts should be extremely hesitant to decide, as a matter of law, that 
no reasonable jury could infer an agreement among the defendants. As Judge 
 
 211 See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing probative synergy of Cartel Markers). 
 212 Leslie, supra note 63, at 44. 
 213 Furthermore, the circumstantial case is magnified even more significantly if this combination of 
both components of a Cartel Enforcement system is united with other plus factors from another category, 
such as evidence of one or more Cartel Markers. The cartel-enforcement regime shows the machinations 
of collusion and the Cartel Markers reveal the collusion’s effects. 
 214  See Cascades Comput. Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12–CV–1143 YGR, 2013 WL 
6247594, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“Courts weighing an antitrust defendant’s motion to dismiss 
should consider the plaintiff’s allegations in their entirety and refrain from ‘tightly compartmentalizing 
the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each.’” (quoting In re High-
Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2012))); see also In re Rail Freight 
Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 n.4 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that Twombly did not 
change the Continental Ore standard). 
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Richard Posner explained, it is a mistake for judges “to suppose that if no 
single item of evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to 
conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary judgment.”215 
Unfortunately, a judicial failure to examine an antitrust plaintiff’s evidence 
through the lens of probative synergy can lead courts to grant summary 
judgment to defendants when terminating the litigation before trial is 
inappropriate. Using examples across the federal circuits, Part IV explains 
how this happens with unfortunate regularity. 
IV. HOW COURTS COMPARTMENTALIZE EVIDENCE OF PRICE FIXING 
Despite the Supreme Court’s directive that judges and juries should not 
compartmentalize or dismember an antitrust plaintiff’s evidence, federal 
courts repeatedly isolate individual plus factors and improperly deprive them 
of their collective probative value. This Part explains the two principal ways 
in which they do so. First, some courts discuss each of the plaintiff’s 
proffered plus factors only in seclusion and do not consider plus factors in 
relation to each other. Second, many courts improperly discount any single 
plus factor that cannot unilaterally satisfy the Matsushita standard for 
surviving summary judgment on antitrust claims. Almost every plus factor 
described in Part II has been the subject of at least one of these fundamental 
errors. In order to show that these mistakes distort the results in actual cases, 
this Part also presents a series of case studies in which judges 
compartmentalized the plaintiffs’ proffered plus factors and improperly 
dismissed or granted summary judgment on a price-fixing claim. 
A. Isolating and Discounting Plus Factors 
Courts often compartmentalize individual plus factors and deprive them 
of their probative value. Judges do this over the range of plus-factor 
categories. For example, courts routinely isolate evidence regarding Cartel 
Susceptibility. Judges are prone to isolating evidence of market structure by 
asserting, as the district court in Pennsylvania did in In re Chocolate 
Confectionary Antitrust Litigation, that “[t]he mere fact that a market may 
exhibit oligarchic tendencies and characteristics is, without more, 
insufficient to establish antitrust liability.”216 The court granted summary 
judgment, which the Third Circuit affirmed, even though the “defendants’ 
own experts reach[ed] many of the same conclusions as [the plaintiffs’ 
experts] with respect to whether market conditions were ripe for 
 
 215 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 216 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 790 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (emphasis added), aff’d, 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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collusion[,] . . . . agree[ing] . . . that factors such as high market 
concentration, high entry barriers, collusive opportunities, and closely 
substitutable products tend to be more conducive to conspiratorial 
behavior.”217 This is a mistake because even if the court is correct that the 
market structure “without more” was insufficient to show collusion, that 
market structure needs to be analyzed in context with other plus factors for 
which the plaintiff provides evidence.218 Yet courts often fail to do so. For 
example, despite the fact that the defendants’ collective market power is a 
plus factor,219 one Florida district court ignored a bundle of other plus factors 
as it asserted that “[t]he fact that a group of alleged price-fixers possess 
power in a particular market does not, standing alone, make it more likely 
that the members of that group have entered into an agreement to fix 
prices.”220 That is incorrect; collective market power does “make it more 
likely” that defendants will engage in collusion.221 Market structure itself 
might not be sufficient to prove collusion, but it is evidence that supports an 
inference that collusion occurred. Reading plus factors holistically, as judges 
and juries are supposed to do, can show that the defendants’ parallel behavior 
was more likely the result of collusion than of independent action. 
With respect to Cartel Formation plus factors, courts regularly isolate 
the opportunity-to-conspire plus factor from the other plus factors in order 
to incorrectly assert that opportunity is not probative of collusion.222 While 
evidence of an opportunity to conspire does not prove that the defendants 
took that opportunity, it is probative of whether collusion occurred. Courts 
 
 217 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 218 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 
78 (2010) (“Courts are unlikely to find that market structure, by itself, is a sufficient plus factor to prove 
conspiracy. In combination with evidence of other plus factors, however, market structure can constitute 
probative evidence of conspiracy.” (emphasis added)). 
 A case study of the plus factors presented in the Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust case, and the Third 
Circuit’s serial isolation of those plus factors, is presented infra Section IV.C.4. 
 219 See supra notes 31–46 and accompanying text. 
 220 Capitol Body Shop, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1235–36 (M.D. 
Fla. 2016) (emphasis added). 
 221 See supra notes 31–46 and accompanying text. 
 222 See In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 911 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Moreover, 
a mere opportunity to conspire does not, standing alone, plausibly suggest an illegal agreement . . . .”); 
Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he mere opportunity to 
conspire among antitrust defendants does not, standing alone, permit the inference of conspiracy.” (citing 
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 827 (11th. Cir. 1990))); Utesch v. Dittmer, 947 F.2d 321, 
331 (8th Cir. 1991) (“A jury cannot reasonably infer the existence of a conspiracy merely from the 
opportunity to form one.” (quoting H.J., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1545 (8th Cir. 
1989))). 
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are prone to belittle this plus factor as “the mere opportunity to conspire.”223 
However, cases in which courts refer to such “mere” opportunities generally 
also involve evidence establishing a significant number of additional plus 
factors.224  
Moreover, in extrapolating from the fact that opportunity alone is not 
sufficient to prove collusion, some courts have suggested that opportunity is, 
thus, not evidence at all. For example, the Eighth Circuit asserted that the 
opportunity to conspire is “not necessarily probative evidence of price-fixing 
conspiracy.” 225  Similarly, the Third Circuit endorsed the notion that 
“evidence of ‘opportunity’ should be accorded little, if any weight.” 226 
Through their language and their application, these opinions imply or hold 
that opportunity to conspire is not a plus factor.227 For example, one federal 
judge concluded that “[t]he fact that [the defendant] engaged in social 
informal communication and joined a lobbying group is merely some 
evidence that they had the opportunity to conspire, it is not a plus factor.”228 
These judicial opinions are wrong: opportunity to conspire is a plus factor, 
and it is evidence that the defendants could have conspired. It just is not 
enough on its own to prove a conspiracy. That is why this evidence should 
be interpreted in the context of all of the other plus factors pled by the 
plaintiffs—to determine whether other evidence indicates that the defendants 
took advantage of the opportunity. 
Similarly, with respect to plus factors in the Cartel Management 
category, courts often take highly probative evidence, sequester it, and then 
 
 223 See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 
1993) (emphasis added). 
 224 See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 409 (3d Cir. 2015); 
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1317–19 (11th Cir. 2003); Blomkest Fertilizer, 
Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1036–37 (8th Cir. 2000); In re High Fructose Corn 
Syrup Antitrust Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033–35 (C.D. Ill. 2001), rev’d, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 
2002); see infra notes 304–323 and accompanying text (discussing plus factors in the Chocolate 
Confectionary Antitrust case). 
 225 Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1036 (citing Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 641 F.2d 457, 
462 (7th Cir. 1981)); see also Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 545 (“The mere opportunity to conspire does 
not by itself support the inference that . . . an illegal combination actually occurred.”); In re Citric Acid 
Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that opportunities to conspire “do not tend to exclude 
the possibility of legitimate activity”); Weit, 641 F.2d at 462 (“[T]he mere opportunity to conspire, even 
in the context of parallel business conduct, is not necessarily probative evidence.”). 
 226 In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 133 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 227 See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 804 (M.D. Pa. 2014) 
(“Limited evidence of opportunities to conspire is not a plus factor enhancing the plausibility of plaintiffs’ 
claims.”), aff’d, 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 228 Alexander v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Market 
Force Inc. v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 906 F.2d 1167, 1172 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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treat it as innocuous on its own. For example, notwithstanding the inherent 
dubiousness of having competitors’ pricing materials in one’s files, the Ninth 
Circuit has opined that “the possession of competitor price lists . . . does not, 
at least in itself, tend to exclude legitimate competitive behavior.”229 But, of 
course, such evidence was not intended to do so “in itself”; it was one plus 
factor among many.230  
Other circuits have weakened the import of this plus factor by 
misconstruing the relationship between plus factors and proof of agreement. 
Notably, in In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation,231 the Third 
Circuit discounted the fact that the alleged conspirators possessed each 
other’s nonpublic “advance pricing information” because, according to the 
court, “[t]he ‘mere possession of competitive memoranda’ is not evidence of 
concerted action to fix prices.”232 The Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust 
court relied on the Third Circuit precedent in In re Baby Food Antitrust 
Litigation, which characterized Eleventh Circuit precedent as holding the 
“[e]xchange of pricing information by itself is an insufficient basis upon 
which to allow an inference of agreement to fix prices.”233 One year after 
Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust, the Third Circuit described the circuit’s 
precedent as holding “that the sharing of confidential information may be 
evidence of a conspiracy, not that it must be.”234 The court’s articulation is 
incorrect. The “sharing of confidential information” among horizontal 
competitors is always circumstantial evidence of conspiracy; it just might 
not be sufficient evidence to prove a conspiracy without other circumstantial 
evidence. That is why opportunity evidence needs to be interpreted in light 
of all of the other plaintiff-proffered plus factors.235 
Regarding the Suspicious Statements category, courts routinely isolate 
incriminating statements made by defendants’ executives and employees 
 
 229 In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1103 (emphasis added). 
 230 See infra notes 323–345 and accompanying text (discussing how the Ninth Circuit in Citric Acid 
mishandled the plus-factor analysis). 
 231 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 232 Id. at 407–08 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d 
Cir. 1999)). 
 233 In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 126 (emphasis added) (citing Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, 
Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1505 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 429 F. 
Supp. 2d 117, 132 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Evidence that competitors merely exchanged information does not 
establish a conspiracy.”). 
 234 Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC, 820 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 235 As shown infra Section IV.C.4, the plaintiffs proffered evidence of many additional plus factors 
in Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust, which the court also isolated and mishandled. 
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during the course of the alleged conspiracy.236 Similarly, despite the fact that 
defendants advancing pretextual explanations for their parallel or suspicious 
conduct is a plus factor, courts routinely sequester such evidence and assert 
that “pretext alone does not create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy.”237 
Even though “pretext alone” might not prove a conspiracy, courts should not 
discredit the legal significance of the defendants’ false exculpatory 
statements after the conspiracy has been alleged. False explanations for 
suspicious conduct—such as intercommunications, buybacks, and cartel 
markers—make the underlying conduct even more probative of collusion.238 
Finally, several courts have sapped even Multipurpose Plus Factors of 
their evidentiary value by looking at them in isolation. For example, despite 
the fact that the defendants’ price-fixing activities in other countries can help 
establish several separate plus factors,239 several courts have isolated such 
evidence and deprived it of any probative value. 240  For example, while 
ignoring a multitude of other plus factors, one Michigan court asserted that 
“the existence of conspiracies in another country, without more, does not 
support an inference of a conspiracy to fix prices in the United States.”241 
That is incorrect; evidence of foreign collusion “support[s] an inference” of 
domestic collusion even if it alone does not prove it. Likewise, even when 
plaintiffs present so-called “traditional conspiracy” evidence, courts 
routinely segregate this evidence from the other proffered plus factors and 
assert that such “economic evidence alone cannot demonstrate a tacit 
agreement” when a market is concentrated.242 Yet, it is precisely the fact that 
such evidence exists in the context of a market that is susceptible to 
cartelization that renders this evidence particularly probative. 
 
 236 See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 152 F. Supp. 3d 234, 249–50 (D. Del. 
2016), aff’d, 873 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 237 In re Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d at 411 (emphasis added); see also In re Linerboard 
Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“[W]ithout more, evidence of pretext is 
insufficient.” (citing DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1514 (11th Cir. 
1989))); Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43, 49 (D. Mass. 1984) (“[T]he fact that a business reason 
advanced for action against plaintiff is pretextual does not without more justify the inference that the 
conduct was the result of a conspiracy.” (emphasis added) (citing Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 
688 F.2d 853, 857 (1st Cir. 1982))). 
 238  Leslie, supra note 4 (manuscript at 36). 
 239 See supra notes 171–186 and accompanying text. 
 240 Leslie, supra note 174, at 608 (reviewing antitrust “opinions [that] seem to suggest that because 
foreign price fixing is not dispositive proof of domestic price fixing that it is not a plus factor”). 
 241 Ren v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 00-004035-CZ, slip op. at 22 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003) 
(emphasis added). 
 242 Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 193 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis 
added). Although the court claimed to examine the evidence as a whole, it did not. See infra notes 266–
269 and accompanying text. 
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For courts to repeatedly say that one factor alone or without more does 
not prove collusion is largely meaningless. Plus factors were never intended 
to be looked at in isolation or to stand on their own as definitive proof of an 
agreement. That is the entire essence of a factor test. In price-fixing cases in 
which the plaintiffs have proffered evidence of several plus factors, for 
judges to consistently emphasize that one factor alone does not by itself 
prove collusion suggests unfamiliarity with how factor tests work. Factors 
must be examined in the aggregate precisely because they are factors, not 
elements. 
B. The Judicial Misapplication of Matsushita 
The starting point for many mistakes related to the judicial isolation and 
rejection of individual plus factors is a misreading of the Supreme Court’s 
Matsushita opinion. On the facts before them, the five-Justice majority in 
Matsushita found the plaintiffs’ claim of a predatory-pricing conspiracy 
implausible because the conspiracy would have required the defendants to 
lose money in the short term with an uncertain payoff later.243 The majority 
held that “if the factual context renders [the plaintiffs’] claim implausible—
if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense—[the plaintiffs] 
must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim 
than would otherwise be necessary.”244  
Although Matsushita involved an alleged predatory-pricing conspiracy, 
which the Matsushita majority found implausible, lower federal courts have 
applied Matsushita’s heightened summary judgment standard to traditional 
price-fixing cases. This is a mistake because there is nothing “implausible” 
about price-fixing conspiracies, which are common, profitable, and require 
no short-term losses. Thus, courts should not invoke the Matsushita rule, 
which heightens the summary judgment standard for implausible claims, 
when adjudicating price-fixing claims.245 Ultimately, the Matsushita Court 
concluded that “[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment . . . , a plaintiff 
seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence ‘that tends to 
exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted independently.”246 
This language has spawned a wave of judicial error. 
 
 243 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589, 592 (1986); see also 
Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1719 (2013) 
(critiquing Matsushita). 
 244 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 
 245 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357–58 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 246 475 U.S. at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). 
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Leaving aside that Matsushita should not apply to price-fixing claims 
at all, courts also should not apply Matsushita “to discredit each separate 
piece of proffered evidence an antitrust plaintiff brings forth.”247 Matsushita 
requires weighing all of the evidence collectively to determine whether that 
evidence as a whole supports an inference of conspiracy.248 As Judge Posner 
explained, at the summary judgment stage, “no single piece of the 
evidence . . . is sufficient in itself to prove a price-fixing conspiracy. But that 
is not the question. The question is simply whether this evidence, considered 
as a whole and in combination with the economic evidence, is sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment.”249 Similarly, the Second Circuit has explained: 
“A court deciding whether to grant summary judgment should not view each 
piece of evidence in a vacuum. Seemingly innocent or ambiguous behavior 
can give rise to a reasonable inference of conspiracy in light of the 
background against which the behavior takes place.” 250  In short, the 
Matsushita legal standard should not be applied to individual plus factors 
one at a time.  
Courts nonetheless improperly apply the Matsushita standard to 
individual plus factors and then discount or completely disregard each plus 
factor because it cannot singlehandedly satisfy the Matsushita test of tending 
to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently. Judges 
have committed this mistake across every plus-factor category described in 
Part II’s typology. At the outset, although market characteristics are 
important for showing Cartel Susceptibility, some courts have mistakenly 
rejected market concentration as a plus factor because the “inherent 
characteristics of an oligopoly . . . cannot tend to exclude independent 
action.”251 Similarly, in the category of Cartel Formation plus factors, the 
Ninth Circuit has rejected evidence of opportunities to conspire as sufficient 
to support an inference of conspiracy because they “do not tend to exclude 
the possibility of legitimate activity.”252 This approach is incorrect because 
 
 247 Valspar, 873 F.3d at 216 (Stengel, J., dissenting) (citing In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358 n.8, 
359 n.9); see also Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1049 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“The plaintiff’s evidence must amount to more than a scintilla, but 
the plaintiff does not have to outweigh the defendant’s evidence item by item.” (citing Rossi v. Standard 
Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir.1998))). 
 248 See In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (D. Kan. 2012). 
 249 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 250 Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 254–55 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 251 Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 242 P.3d 280, 296 (N.M. 2010); see also In re Domestic Drywall 
Antitrust Litig., 163 F. Supp. 3d 175, 231 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“Evidence that participants in an oligopolistic 
market acted the same way at the same time will always be insufficient, standing alone, to defeat a 
summary judgment motion.”).  
 252 In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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no single plus factor alone can “tend to exclude the possibility” of 
independent action. No individual plus factor is supposed to. 
Courts have replicated this mistake for plus factors in the Cartel 
Management and Cartel Enforcement categories. For example, even though 
cartels often use price announcements to manage and adjust cartel-fixed 
prices, the district court in Valspar Corp. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.253 
disparaged them as a plus factor because “nothing about these [competitor 
price] announcements tends to exclude the possibility of independent 
action.”254 Similarly, even though price verification among competitors is an 
important form of cartel monitoring, and thus Cartel Enforcement, the Eighth 
Circuit segregated the evidence of the defendants’ price verifications by 
concluding that such “evidence falls far short of excluding the possibility of 
independent action.” 255  These decisions take the Matsushita standard—
which should be applied to all of the plaintiff’s evidence collectively—and 
use it to discount evidence of an individual plus factor. 
Federal judges have similarly undermined the significance of Cartel 
Markers. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Reserve Supply Corp. v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. discounted the plaintiff’s proof of price 
discrimination, stating that the evidence was insufficient by itself to create a 
“genuine issue of triable fact.” 256  The Reserve Supply court further 
discredited evidence of “increased prices during a period of low demand” 
that “[did] not unambiguously suggest . . . an agreement to fix prices.”257 
This is incorrect and asks too much from plus factors because no individual 
plus factor can constitute “unambiguous” evidence of collusion. Similarly, 
in an opinion affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, the district court in Hall v. 
United Air Lines, Inc. discounted long-term static market shares as a plus 
factor because “the stability of their market shares does not tend to exclude 
the possibility that defendants acted independently, particularly in light of a 
lack of any direct evidence to the contrary.”258 The court isolated stable 
market shares from all of the other plus factors proffered by the plaintiffs, 
including price signaling, communications through trade association 
meetings, price discrimination, a history of collusion, and a bevy of plus 
 
 253 152 F. Supp. 3d 234 (D. Del. 2016). 
 254 Id. at 249. 
 255 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1034–35 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
 256  971 F.2d 37, 51 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 257 Id. at 52 (diminishing evidence of “increased prices during a period of low demand”). 
 258  296 F. Supp. 2d 652, 676 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing In re Citric Acid Litig., 
191 F.3d 1090, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App’x 680 (4th 
Cir. 2004). 
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factors related to Cartel Susceptibility, including an oligopolistic market, 
entry barriers, and “highly fungible” products. 259  The court slighted the 
plaintiffs’ evidence of stable market shares because it alone could not satisfy 
the Matsushita standard and because the plaintiffs did not present direct 
evidence.260 But, of course, if the plaintiff had direct evidence, it would not 
need to rely on plus factors in the first place, since the entire purpose of plus 
factors is to prove agreements circumstantially rather than through direct 
evidence. 
Courts have also repeated this mistake with Multipurpose Plus Factors. 
For example, even though prior collusion in a product market is a strong 
indicator of later collusion, courts have applied the Matsushita standard to 
hold that an alleged “‘history of collusion’ in the industry does not tend to 
exclude the possibility that Defendants were engaged in lawful conduct 
during” the period alleged by the plaintiffs.261 Some courts have gone so far 
as to (incorrectly) conclude that the defendants’ history of collusion is not a 
plus factor at all.262 
In all of the above cases, courts have misapplied the Matsushita 
standard for surviving summary judgment—a legal test that requires 
evaluating the plaintiff’s bundle of evidence collectively263—by applying 
Matsushita’s language to each single piece of circumstantial evidence on its 
own. This application is wrong because no single plus factor is meant to tend 
to exclude the possibility of independent action. Rather, the bundle of 
proffered plus factors should be analyzed holistically to determine whether 
they collectively establish that the defendants did not act independently. 
Moreover, in misapplying the Matsushita test, some courts have decimated 
plus factors altogether. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Williamson Oil 
asserted that if a piece of circumstantial evidence “does not tend to exclude 
the possibility of independent action (or tend to establish a price fixing 
conspiracy), . . . [it] cannot constitute a plus factor.”264 That is wrong. An 
individual piece of evidence need not tend to “exclude the possibility of 
 
 259  Id. at 672–76. 
 260  Id. at 676. 
 261 Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 
2002), aff’d sub nom. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 262 See, e.g., Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 670–71 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (“Thus, we do 
not find the claimed history of collusion to be a viable plus factor.”).  
 263 It bears repeating that this is the legal standard for implausible antitrust claims (such as predatory 
pricing), not price-fixing cases (which are inherently more plausible). See supra notes 247–249 and 
accompanying text. 
 264 346 F.3d at 1313. In a related state case, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Williamson Oil opinion to reject the plaintiffs’ plus factors one at a time in seriatim because 
each one individually did “not tend to exclude independent conduct.” Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 
242 P.3d 280, 296–98 (N.M. 2010). 
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independent action.” The plus factors discussed in Part II’s typology are just 
that: factors. None of them alone is determinative. The only issue in any 
given price-fixing case based on circumstantial evidence is whether the 
plaintiffs have presented a sufficient bundle of plus factors from which a 
reasonable jury could infer that the defendant colluded to restrain 
competition. 
While citing Matsushita, courts have deviated from Continental Ore’s 
mandate that an antitrust plaintiff’s evidence be considered holistically. As 
a matter of common law, this would be permissible if the Matsushita opinion 
had, in fact, reversed or limited Continental Ore. But it did not. The two 
Supreme Court opinions are not in tension. The holding of Continental Ore 
is not now, nor has it ever been, controversial. Courts should not 
compartmentalize an antitrust plaintiff’s evidence. 
But across circuits and across plus factors, courts fail to recognize that 
the Matsushita standard should not be applied to individual plus factors. 
When courts impose such a requirement, they effectively eliminate 
plaintiffs’ ability to prove collusion through circumstantial evidence, since 
no single piece of circumstantial evidence is ever sufficient on its own. 
Looking at one factor in isolation deprives that factor of its antitrust 
significance because the factors must be examined collectively in order to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence of enough factors to create a 
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of agreement. 
C. Case Studies 
It may be tempting to think that the prior discussion selected isolated 
examples of sloppy judicial language that did not affect the ultimate decision 
or cause any miscarriage of justice. This Section refutes that objection by 
presenting several case studies in which the judicial practice of isolating plus 
factors in price-fixing cases caused the court to improperly grant or affirm 
summary judgment for the defendants. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs 
proffered more than enough circumstantial evidence to reach a jury, but 
judges violated the Continental Ore rule and segregated each plus factor, 
viewing it in isolation from its companion evidence. 
1. Valspar 
In evaluating a plaintiff’s catalog of plus factors, some courts never 
consider the relationship among the proffered plus factors. For example, in 
Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 265  the Third Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment for defendants who had been accused of fixing 
prices in the multibillion-dollar titanium dioxide market. The two-judge 
 
 265 873 F.3d 185, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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majority isolated each of the proffered plus factors, depriving them of any 
probative synergy. For example, they downplayed the fact that the 
defendants engaged in thirty-one parallel price increases—an unprecedented 
number—even though no market conditions prompted the price hikes.266 The 
plaintiffs proffered plus factors related to Cartel Susceptibility (market 
concentration, homogeneous products, and a market susceptible to 
conspiracy); Cartel Formation (including exchanges of confidential 
information); Cartel Management (in the form of price signaling); Cartel 
Enforcement (most significantly, intercompany sales of titanium dioxide at 
below market price); Cartel Markers (such as relatively static market shares); 
and Suspicious Conduct (such as “abrupt departure from pre-conspiracy 
conduct”). 267  Thus, the plaintiffs presented significant evidence that the 
defendants were engaging in cartel formation, management, and 
enforcement conduct in a market that was highly susceptible to illegal price 
fixing and where Cartel Markers indicated that the defendants’ thirty-one 
parallel price hikes were the product of collusion. In affirming summary 
judgment for the defendants, and despite claiming to “consider the evidence 
as a whole,”268 the Third Circuit never considered how these plus factors 
related to each other. For example, when denying the intercompetitor sales 
any probative value, the court did not consider that those below-cost 
transactions occurred in the context of static market shares and thirty-one 
parallel price increases. If the court had not compartmentalized the plus 
factors, it would have permitted the plaintiffs to make their case to a jury.269 
2. Williamson Oil 
Judges often criticize the plaintiff’s proffered individual plus-factor 
evidence one piece at a time and then assert that collectively the bundle of 
plus factors is insufficient to survive summary judgment. In Williamson Oil 
Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 270  the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment for price-fixing defendants by isolating each of the plaintiffs’ 
proffered plus factors. The plaintiffs presented plus factors related to Cartel 
Susceptibility by showing that the defendants operated in a tobacco market 
structure that was highly concentrated and had high barriers to entry, 
involved a fungible product, and exhibited inelastic demand at competitive 
 
 266 Id. at 207, 218 (Stengel, J., dissenting). 
 267 Id. at 218. 
 268  Id. at 201 (majority opinion). 
 269  Id. at 218 (Stengel, J., dissenting) (“Viewed together, and not compartmentalized, all this 
evidence was more than sufficient to preclude summary judgment.”). 
 270 346 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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prices.271 The plaintiffs also noted that prices could be changed quickly, 
which would facilitate active price fixing. 272  With regard to Cartel 
Formation, the plaintiffs explained the defendants’ strong motivation to 
conspire and many opportunities to do so. 273  The plaintiffs submitted 
evidence of plus factors related to Cartel Management, including ongoing 
communications and signaling of price intentions. 274  The plaintiffs also 
presented the components of a Cartel Enforcement program, including the 
mutual monitoring of sales and the establishment of permanent allocation 
programs. 275  The effectiveness of this allocation established the Cartel 
Marker of stable market shares, which the plaintiffs also alleged. 276  The 
plaintiffs presented a number of suspicious activities, including the 
defendants’ failure to perform meaningful business analysis before raising 
prices and reducing the number of tiers in pricing, which would make it 
easier for cartel managers to fix prices and monitor compliance.277 Finally, 
the plaintiffs also proffered double-duty plus factors such as actions against 
economic self-interest, a long history of antitrust violations, foreign price-
fixing activities, and participation in other conspiracies involving the health 
effects of smoking. 278  These Multipurpose Plus Factors showed that the 
defendants had demonstrated their willingness and ability to collude. 
Ultimately, the plaintiffs alleged approximately twenty individual plus 
factors. 
Despite this plethora of plus factors, the Eleventh Circuit isolated the 
plus factors one at a time and held each one insufficient on its own to defeat 
the defendants’ summary judgment motion. The appellate panel ultimately 
reasoned that because “none of [proffered plus factors] actually tends to 
exclude the possibility of independent behavior,” that meant that the 
plaintiffs could not “demonstrate the existence of a plus factor.” 279  That 
conclusion is, in a word, bizarre. The court applied the Matsushita standard 
to each individual plus factor—which is inappropriate280—to conclude that 
the plaintiffs proffered no evidence of plus factors whatsoever. The court’s 
language here is troubling; it asserted that the plaintiffs failed to show “a 
plus factor,” any plus factor, suggesting that the plaintiffs did not proffer 
 
 271 Id. at 1296, 1317. 
 272 Id. at 1317. 
 273 Id. at 1305, 1319. 
 274 Id. at 1305–09. 
 275 Id. at 1293, 1315. 
 276 Id. at 1318. 
 277  Id. at 1310–11. 
 278 Id. at 1310, 1315–18. 
 279 Id. at 1304, 1323. 
 280 See supra notes 243–264 and accompanying text. 
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evidence of a single plus factor. The court never looked at the twenty-some 
plus factors collectively because it falsely asserted said that there were no 
plus factors to aggregate. While it is true that none of the proffered plus 
factors individually proved a conspiracy, the Eleventh Circuit was wrong to 
rule that because no plus factor on its own was sufficient, that meant there 
were no plus factors at all. 
Audaciously, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that it had obeyed the 
Continental Ore prohibition against compartmentalizing an antitrust 
plaintiff’s evidence. For example, the court concluded that “we are satisfied 
that none of the actions on which appellants’ arguments are based rise to the 
level of plus factors. Nor do they constitute plus factors when considered in 
concert.”281 This is not the cumulative analysis demanded by Continental 
Ore; instead, the court looked at each plus factor in isolation, decided it was 
insufficient on its own, and deprived it of any probative value. The court then 
added this column of zeroes to conclude that there were no plus factors of 
any kind. 
Moreover, at some junctures, the Williamson Oil court claimed to be 
analyzing evidence collectively while explicitly refusing to do. For example, 
when the plaintiffs explained how several actions and statements made by 
the defendants constituted price signals, which are an important plus 
factor,282 the judges disregarded this evidence because none of these actions 
satisfied the Matsushita standard of “tend[ing] to exclude the possibility . . . 
[of] lawful, parallel pricing behavior.” 283  The judges next claimed that 
examining the evidence of price signals “cumulatively” could not change 
their conclusion because “the whole of the [defendants’] actions is no greater 
than the sum of its parts. Because none of [defendants’] largely ambiguous 
statements and actions come close to meeting the mark, it is unhelpful . . . to 
consider those actions in concert.”284 The court’s language is telling: the 
judges admitted that because they did not find individual pieces of evidence 
persuasive, they declined to consider them “in concert,” despite the 
Continental Ore mandate to do so. 
In short, the Williamson Oil plaintiffs presented evidence of plus factors 
from every category in the typology presented in Part II. But the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach to this body of circumstantial evidence was astonishingly 
flawed. The court isolated each plus factor, improperly applied the 
Matsushita standard to each individual plus factor, discredited each plus 
 
 281 Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1319–20. 
 282 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
 283 Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310; see supra notes 247–250 and accompanying text (explaining 
why the Matsushita standard does not apply to individual plus factors). 
 284 Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310. 
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factor seriatim, and then asserted that there were no plus factors at all. The 
court did not look at the plaintiffs’ plus factors cumulatively, but then falsely 
claimed that it did before switching course and ultimately admitting that it 
did not. If these plaintiffs’ bundle of plus factors is insufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment, then the court has essentially eliminated the 
circumstantial path to proving price fixing.285 
3. Blomkest 
The Valspar and Williamson Oil cases are not aberrations. Several 
courts have committed this same mistake of isolating individual plus factors, 
declining to aggregate, and failing to appreciate the probative synergy of 
multiple plus factors. For example, in Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash 
Corp. of Saskatchewan, an en banc Eighth Circuit decided by a six-to-five 
majority to affirm summary judgment for defendants accused of fixing prices 
in the billion-dollar market for potash, a fertilizer whose price affects the cost 
of food for all consumers.286 The defendants had conceded that they had 
engaged in parallel pricing, so the case came down to whether the plaintiffs 
had proffered evidence of sufficient plus factors to survive summary 
judgment.287 As in Valspar and Williamson Oil, the plaintiffs in Blomkest 
introduced evidence across the entire range of plus-factor categories. The 
plaintiffs showed Cartel Susceptibility with proof that the potash market was 
concentrated and characterized by high barriers to entry, inelastic demand, 
and a standardized product,288 each of which is a separate plus factor.289 The 
plaintiffs “introduced significant evidence of solicitations to enter a price-
 
 285 Explicitly following the lead of Williamson Oil, a Kansas appellate court made the same mistake 
on the same facts. Instead of looking at the plus factors collectively, the court decided to “consider each 
asserted plus factor in turn” and ruled each one out individually, before outrageously stating: 
Taken individually or collectively, the structure of the market, the meetings between tobacco 
company executives, the exchange of sales information, the history of past misconduct, the actions 
claimed to be contrary to the actors’ independent self-interest, the claimed pretextual reasons for 
actions, the foreign price-fixing claim, and the health conspiracy do not constitute evidence that 
tends to exclude the possibility that Defendants were engaged in lawful conscious parallelism in 
their pricing decisions. With that, we conclude the district court did not err in granting summary 
judgment to Defendants. 
Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 668, 676 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). The court’s approach is 
ridiculous on its face. Similar to the Eleventh Circuit in Williamson Oil, the Kansas court listed all of the 
reasons why the plaintiff’s case deserved to be heard by a jury and then asserted, without reasoning, that 
the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 
 286 203 F.3d 1028, 1031 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 287 Id. at 1034. 
 288 Id. at 1044 (Gibson, J. dissenting). 
 289 See supra notes 31–47 and accompanying text. 
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fixing agreement”290—one of the most important plus factors related to Cartel 
Formation—as well as a “joint action” plan by one of the defendants to raise 
the price of potash.291 To show Cartel Management plus factors, the plaintiffs 
pointed to the defendants’ advance price announcements and exchanging of 
price lists. 292  The majority, however, discounted all evidence of 
intercompetitor communications by asserting that “the evidence of interfirm 
communications does not tend to exclude the possibility of independent 
action, as required under Monsanto and Matsushita.”293 The court failed to 
appreciate that Matsushita should not be applied to individual plus factors.294 
Perhaps most significantly, the plaintiffs demonstrated both 
components of a Cartel Enforcement regime. Regarding cartel monitoring, 
the plaintiffs pointed to the fact that the rival executives had called each other 
dozens of times to verify the prices that they had previously charged on 
specific sales. 295  Despite the fact that price-verification schemes are an 
important plus factor in the Cartel Enforcement category, 296 the majority 
disaggregated the defendants’ price verification calls, treating them as 
“circumstantial evidence . . . that . . . bears no relationship to the price 
increases” and depriving them of probative value.297 In addition, the plaintiffs 
presented evidence of “an explicitly discussed cheater punishment 
program.”298 The majority, nonetheless, failed to connect the dots and see 
that the defendants had effected a complete Cartel Enforcement program that 
had both components of monitoring and punishment. 
The Blomkest plaintiffs also presented evidence of a plethora of 
additional plus factors. Beyond the communications previously discussed, 
the plaintiffs also showed Suspicious Statements by the defendants, such as 
complaints about a rival’s price-cutting activity and resulting apologies for 
charging a low price.299 These are important plus factors because rivals do 
 
 290 Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1044 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
 291 Id. at 1039, 1044. 
 292 Id. at 1037 (majority opinion). 
 293 Id. at 1033. 
 294 See supra notes 247–250 and accompanying text. 
 295  Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1033. 
 296 See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 297 Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1033. In contrast, the five-judge dissent recognized that price verification 
is a cartel monitoring device. Id. at 1047 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“[I]f there were a cartel, it would be 
crucial for the cartel members to cooperate in telling each other about actual prices charged in order to 
prevent the sort of widespread discounting that would eventually sink the cartel.”). 
 298 Id. at 1051. 
 299 Id. at 1045. 
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not communicate that way in a noncollusive, competitive market.300 As a 
Cartel Marker, the plaintiffs also demonstrated that the defendants’ “prices 
were roughly equivalent during the alleged conspiracy, despite differing 
production costs.” 301  Finally, the plaintiffs introduced expert-written 
“econometric models which purport to prove that the price of potash would 
have been substantially lower in the absence of collusion.”302 Ultimately, the 
Eighth Circuit disaggregated the plaintiffs’ plentiful evidence, never 
considered the probative synergy of the plus factors, and improperly blocked 
a case that should have advanced to a jury trial.303 
4. Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust 
All of these antitrust opinions suffer from the same fundamental flaw: 
they never consider how the plus factors identified by the plaintiffs relate to 
each other. In other words, they never contemplate the concept of probative 
synergy—the fact that evidence of individual plus factors gains in its 
probative value when it exists in conjunction with certain other plus 
factors.304 In In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation, for example, 
the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for price-fixing defendants305 
but provided no explanation for why the plaintiffs’ collection of plus factors 
was deficient. The plaintiffs had demonstrated plus factors across the 
categories of Cartel Susceptibility (market concentration 306 ); Cartel 
Formation (motive 307  and opportunity, including intercompetitor 
 
 300 See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text. 
 301 Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1032. This is suspicious because in a competitive market, firms with lower 
production costs would charge a lower price and take market share away from less efficient rivals. 
 302 Id. at 1033. 
 303 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 134–35 
(2005) (condemning Blomkest for misunderstanding conscious parallelism because “[c]ajoling 
competitors into adhering to their posted price lists, or reprimanding them when they steal sales, is not 
conscious parallelism: it is collusion[;] [t]he combination of market structure and history and these 
communications was more than enough to create an inference of agreement”); Edward D. Cavanagh, 
Matsushita at Thirty: Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far in Favor of Summary Judgment?, 82 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 81, 101 (2018) (“Blomkest is a classic example of improper issue-weighing at the summary judgment 
stage.”); Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 683, 743 n.151 (2011) (critiquing Blomkest). 
 304 Obviously, this Article does not condemn courts for not using the phrase “probative synergy,” 
which originates in this Article. But courts should have been employing this concept—however 
christened—ever since the Supreme Court’s 1962 Continental Ore opinion. See supra notes 205–207 and 
accompanying text. 
 305 801 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 306 Id. 
 307 The court isolated and discounted the motive plus factor because “evidence of motive without 
more does not create a reasonable inference of concerted action.” Id. at 398. 
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communications308); Cartel Management (possession of rivals’ confidential 
pricing documents309); Cartel Markers (parallel price increases unexplained 
by cost increases 310 ); Suspicious Statements by defendants (pretextual 
explanations for parallel price increases311); and Multipurpose Plus Factors 
(actions against self-interest312 and participation in contemporaneous illegal 
price fixing in another country313). 
The Third Circuit approached the plaintiffs’ plus factors in a manner 
designed to deprive them of their full probative value. The court began by 
noting that “evidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a 
reasonable inference of a conspiracy” and that “a plaintiff must also show 
that certain plus factors are present.”314 While this is a correct articulation of 
the standard, the court proceeded to isolate and discount every one of the 
plus factors, as follows: 
 “[E]vidence of mere opportunities . . . cannot alone support an 
inference of a conspiracy.”315 
 “[E]vidence of motive without more does not create a 
reasonable inference of concerted action . . . .”316 
 “A conspiracy elsewhere, without more, generally does not 
tend to prove a domestic conspiracy . . . .”317 
 “[S]ocial contacts between competitors without more are not 
unlawful.”318 
 “[P]retext alone does not create a reasonable inference of a 
conspiracy.”319 
 
 308 Id. at 409. 
 309 Id. at 407–08. The court isolated and discounted this evidence by asserting that “[t]he ‘mere 
possession of competitive memoranda’ is not evidence of concerted action to fix prices.” Id. at 408 
(quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 310 Id. at 399. 
 311 Id. at 410–11. 
 312 Id. at 399–401. 
 313 Id. at 401–02; see Leslie, supra note 174, at 604–08 (explaining the mistakes in the Chocolate 
Confectionary Antitrust opinion regarding the legal significance of defendants’ participation in foreign 
cartels). 
 314 In re Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d at 398 (first citing In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122; 
and then citing In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 315 Id. at 409 (emphasis added). 
 316 Id. at 398 (emphasis added). 
 317 Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
 318 Id. at 406 (emphasis added). 
 319 Id. at 411 (emphasis added). 
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In closing, the court acknowledged its mistake and then doubled down, 
asserting, “[W]e held that some of this evidence individually was insufficient 
‘without more,’ but taken together, the aforementioned evidence does not 
provide the necessary ‘more’ to survive summary judgment.”320 No further 
analysis explained the court’s decision. While each factor “alone” or 
“without more” did not prove an agreement, the court failed to explain for 
each plus factor why the evidence presented for the other plus factor did not 
constitute the “more” that proof of conspiracy through circumstantial 
evidence requires. 
The plaintiffs’ bundle of plus factors should have sufficed to create a 
genuine issue of material fact and advance the plaintiff’s price-fixing claim 
to a jury. But the Third Circuit never considered the plus factors’ 
relationships with each other. Instead, it dissected them one at a time and 
then concluded that they “do not support a reasonable inference of a 
conspiracy.”321 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court opinion, which 
had asserted “whether considered individually or collectively, the record 
evidence inexorably leads to one conclusion: plaintiffs have adduced no 
evidence tending to exclude the possibility that defendants acted 
independently.”322 It is simply incorrect to assert that the plaintiffs presented 
no evidence. They proffered evidence of plus factors across a range of 
categories. Nevertheless, by compartmentalizing evidence and failing to 
appreciate probative synergy, the court confronted a long list of plus factors 
and incorrectly concluded that there was “no evidence.” 
5. Citric Acid 
Confronted with the mandate to not look at the plaintiffs’ evidence of 
agreement in isolation, most judges would deny that they are segregating the 
plaintiffs’ evidence. Most such protestations ring hollow. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit in In re Citric Acid Litigation claimed to abide by Continental 
Ore’s mandate,323 but an examination of the facts and the court’s reasoning 
reveals mistake after mistake. There is no doubt that sellers of citric acid had 
conspired to fix prices and divide the world market. The Department of 
 
 320 Id. at 412. 
 321 Id. 
 322 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 804 (M.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 
801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015). The district court seemed to accept the defendants’ argument that “motive 
and opportunity, standing alone, fail to establish a Section 1 violation.” Id. at 789 (emphasis added). But 
motive and opportunity were not “standing alone”: they stood together with the other plus factors in the 
case, including the defendants’ illegal price fixing in Canada and advanced knowledge of each other’s 
upcoming price increases. See id. at 797. 
 323 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Justice’s Antitrust Division had already secured guilty pleas and received 
tens of millions of dollars in criminal fines324 from all of the major suppliers 
except one, Cargill, which had escaped criminal prosecution.325  
When purchasers of citric acid sued all of the major citric acid 
manufacturers, including Cargill, for illegally conspiring to fix prices, 
Cargill moved for summary judgment. In opposition, the plaintiffs presented 
a range of circumstantial evidence that Cargill had been a member of the 
already-proven citric acid cartel. For example, Cargill engaged in the same 
“nearly identical” lockstep price increases as the convicted members of the 
cartel.326 The plaintiffs proffered evidence of Cartel Formation and Cartel 
Management. For example, the leaders of the illegal cartel had created the 
European Citric Acid Manufacturers Association (ECAMA) as a fake trade 
association to create a cover for why the competing citric acid manufacturers 
had to be in the same room. Cargill had joined and was a member of 
ECAMA. Cartel business was done during ECAMA meetings. Cargill 
executives attended meetings and had several phone conversations with their 
rival counterparts who were actively managing the citric acid cartel. 327 
Moreover, Cargill possessed copies of their competitors’ price lists and 
exchanged price information with these same competitors, who were 
criminally convicted of price fixing.328  
The Ninth Circuit sapped the evidence of the exchange of price 
information of all probative value by asserting that such conduct “is standard 
fare for trade associations.” 329  The Ninth Circuit ignored the fact that 
ECAMA was not an ordinary trade association; it was created in order to 
“provide a convenient cover for illegal price-fixing discussions.” 330  One 
cartel insider explained “that there always was a meaningless official 
meeting followed by an ‘unofficial’ meeting where the ongoing strategy of 
the conspiracy was developed. The official ECAMA meetings had an 
agenda. The unofficial meetings did not.”331 Thus, the “biennial meetings of 
 
 324 See, e.g., CONNOR, supra note 50, at 358 (“A couple of days later, ADM paid a $30 million fine 
for its role in price fixing in the market for citric acid, an amount that reflected a hefty discount for its 
cooperation with prosecutors.”). 
 325 In re Citric Acid Litig., 996 F. Supp. 951, 953 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
 326  In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1102. 
 327 Id. at 1103. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. at 1098. 
 330 CONNOR, supra note 50, at 192. 
 331 JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS 
MIDLAND 188 (2000). 
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ECAMA were pretexts for holding secret parallel price-fixing sessions for 
citric acid.”332 And Cargill attended these “official” ECAMA meetings. 
The Citric Acid plaintiffs also proffered evidence from other plus-factor 
categories. Regarding Cartel Susceptibility, the citric acid market was not 
merely conducive to cartelization; it was the situs of an active, multiyear 
international cartel that illegally raised prices by hundreds of millions of 
dollars. During the relevant time period, Cargill artificially reduced its 
planned output, cutting it in half, and thereby creating underused capacity, a 
Cartel Marker.333 Cargill took action against its individual interest (which is 
a Multipurpose Plus Factor) by not expanding to make profitable sales and 
thus keeping relative market shares stable (which is a Cartel Marker). Yet 
the Ninth Circuit isolated each piece of this evidence334 and asserted it was 
“untenable” to deny summary judgment to a defendant simply because that 
firm did not increase its market share.335 But, of course, this was not the only 
evidence proffered by the plaintiffs. In addition to these several plus factors, 
the plaintiffs also produced eyewitness testimony. In hindsight, there is 
little doubt that Cargill participated in the citric acid cartel because Barrie 
Cox, an ADM employee who helped run the cartel, gave sworn testimony to 
the FBI that he had more than a dozen conversations with his counterpart at 
Cargill about raising price, rigging bids, and suppressing output.336 The Ninth 
Circuit dismissed Cox’s testimony as “not constitut[ing] direct evidence.”337 
The Ninth Circuit claimed to look at the plaintiffs’ evidence as a 
whole,338 but it did not. Although the court cited Continental Ore for the 
proposition that it must “consider the evidence in the record as a whole,”339 
the judges proceeded to examine the defendant’s evidence, not the plaintiffs’, 
 
 332 CONNOR, supra note 50, at 209. 
 333 See In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1100–01.  
 334 Id. at 1101 (“[I]t is not reasonable to infer that a firm is engaging in illegal activities merely from 
the fact that it failed to continue to increase market share.”). 
 335 Id. 
 336 CONNOR, supra note 50, at 148 (“Cox stated that he had held more than a dozen conversations 
with William Gruber,  his counterpart at Cargill. The conversations dealt with Cargill’s plans to raise 
prices and rig bids to certain customers. Cox said that he agreed to ‘go along’ with Cargill’s plan to raise 
the price of citric acid and restrain ADM’s sales volume.”); David Barboza, Archer Daniels Executive 
Said to Tell of Price-Fixing Talks with Cargill Counterpart, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1999), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/17/business/archer-daniels-executive-said-tell-price-fixing-talks-
with-cargill-counterpart.html [https://perma.cc/DDN6-GQS7]. 
 337 In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1104. 
 338 See id. at 1097. 
 339 Id. at 1102 (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962)). 
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and the judges credited Cargill’s explanation for its suspicious behavior.340 
The Ninth Circuit then committed the error, discussed in Section IV.B, of 
applying the Matsushita standard to individual plus factors.341 For example, 
the panel discounted the plaintiffs’ expert economist report, asserting that 
“no piece of evidence tends to exclude the possibility that Cargill acted 
independently.”342 The case against Cargill was particularly strong given that 
the other members of the cartel had already admitted their participation in 
the illegal conspiracy. And even though the plaintiffs presented plus factors 
across almost every category, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “there is no 
more than a scintilla of evidence that Cargill was a participant in the citric 
acid conspiracy.”343 Despite claiming to consider the plaintiffs’ evidence as 
a whole, the court never did so.344 
The Citric Acid opinion is typical. Although courts routinely claim to 
examine the plaintiff’s evidence of agreement holistically, more often than 
not judges simply assert in passing that the plaintiff’s evidence of plus factors 
is insufficient both individually and collectively. 345  Most judges never 
actually analyze plus factors collectively as a body of evidence that combines 
to create an overall circumstantial case for collusion or evaluate the strength 
of that overall case. Such perfunctory judicial claims of aggregation are 
inadequate and betray an ignorance of how evidence should be analyzed 
holistically. In short, courts do not aggregate plus factors even when they 
claim to be doing so. 
 
 340 Id.; id. at 1106 (“Cargill has offered reasonable legitimate explanations for . . . evidence offered 
by Varni purportedly showing that Cargill engaged in price fixing.”). 
 341 Id. at 1105–06 (stating, before claiming to consider the evidence as a whole, that “[a]pplying the 
legal framework set forth in Matsushita and developed through several subsequent cases in this circuit, 
we have concluded that none of the various pieces of evidence offered by [plaintiff] supports a reasonable 
inference that Cargill conspired to fix prices because none of the evidence, when considered individually, 
tends to exclude the possibility that Cargill acted independently” (emphasis added)). 
 342 Id. at 1105 n.9. 
 343 Id. at 1106. 
 344 Id. at 1105–06. 
 345 See, e.g., In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 
2017) (“Although the Court has analyzed each of Plaintiff’s would-be plus factors sequentially, the 
outcome is the same when they are considered cumulatively.”), aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 714 F. App’x 986 (11th Cir. 2018); In re Hawaiian & Guamanian Cabotage Antitrust Litig., 647 F. 
Supp. 2d 1250, 1260–61 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (“In this case, the whole is not more than the sum of the 
parts.”); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 788, 811–12 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (comparing 
the approach of considering evidence as a whole to “a mosaic whose individual tiles add up to a complete 
picture” (quoting Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2013))). 
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6. Musical Instruments 
The judicial isolation of plus factors is not limited to the consideration 
of summary judgment motions. Courts have also committed this mistake 
when evaluating motions to dismiss filed by price-fixing defendants. For 
example, in In re Musical Instruments & Equipment Antitrust Litigation,346 
the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that Guitar Center, several 
guitar manufacturers, and their trade association (the National Association 
of Music Merchants, or NAMM) had “conspired to implement and enforce 
minimum-advertised-price policies (‘MAP policies’),” which raised retail 
prices.347 When the plaintiffs pled that the defendants used NAMM meetings 
to form and maintain the cartel, the Ninth Circuit viewed this evidence in 
isolation and asserted that “mere participation in trade-organization meetings 
where information is exchanged and strategies are advocated does not 
suggest an illegal agreement.” 348  Not only is compartmentalizing this 
evidence as “mere participation” in a trade association a violation of the 
Continental Ore mandate, it overlooks and downplays the fact that price 
information was exchanged and pricing strategies were discussed among 
competitors. Because such actions help both Cartel Formation and Cartel 
Management, they are themselves important plus factors for inferring 
collusion.  
In response to the plaintiffs’ pleading the existence of Cartel Markers, 
such as defendants’ dramatically increasing prices in tandem even though 
demand was sharply decreasing, the Ninth Circuit asserted that this provided 
“no basis from which we can infer an agreement” because “parallel price 
increases, without more, are no different from other forms of parallel 
conduct.”349 The court’s invocation of “without more” is the classic way to 
isolate a plus factor. More importantly, there was “more,” as the court had 
just acknowledged that demand was decreasing as prices were increasing, 
which makes those price hikes more likely to be the product of collusion and, 
thus, a plus factor.350 Moreover, the plaintiffs had pled the presence of several 
other plus factors, including a common motive to conspire, each company’s 
actions against individual self-interest, adopting “substantially similar MAP 
policies,” and an “FTC investigation and settlement regarding alleged price 
 
 346 798 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 347 Id. at 1189–91. 
 348 Id. at 1196. 
 349 Id. at 1197 (emphasis added). 
 350 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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fixing in the music-products industry, specifically at NAMM-sponsored 
events.”351  
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs pled plus factors across a variety of 
plus-factor categories, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal “because 
plaintiffs’ plus factors add nothing.”352 This is an alarming holding at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage,353 and it flows from the court failing to consider all 
of the plaintiffs’ evidence in context. The two-judge majority on the Ninth 
Circuit panel claimed to examine the evidence as a whole, but never did.354 
Unfortunately, Musical Instruments is not a complete outlier, as district court 
judges sometimes incorrectly isolate the components of a plaintiff’s 
complaint and dismiss price-fixing claims even when the plaintiff has pled a 
variety of relevant plus factors whose probative synergy went unexamined 
by the court.355 
7. Summary 
All of the above opinions have made the same mistake of ignoring the 
probative synergy of plus factors in price-fixing cases. When dismissing 
price-fixing claims or granting summary judgments for Section 1 defendants, 
judges do not discuss how the plus factors presented in the case relate to each 
other despite the fact that plus factors provide context for each other and, 
when viewed in combination, can present a strong circumstantial case for 
collusion.356 Yet, in dozens of cases, courts consistently isolated individual 
plus factors and held that each individual plus factor was insufficient “on its 
own,” “without more,” or “standing alone” to create a circumstantial case 
 
 351 In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1199–1200 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
 352 Id. at 1189 (majority opinion). 
 353 Id. at 1199 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“Both the district court and the majority opinion fault 
plaintiffs for being unable to show agreement between the manufacturer defendants by pinpointing the 
exact terms of the MAP policies and the exact timing of their adoption. Because plaintiffs have not been 
afforded an opportunity to discover these confidential and proprietary policies, it is unfair to require this 
level of specificity at the pleading stage.”); see also William H. Page, Pleading, Discovery, and Proof of 
Sherman Act Agreements: Harmonizing Twombly and Matsushita, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 139–41 
(2018) (critiquing the Ninth Circuit’s application of “a far more exacting standard” at the pleading stage 
and suggesting that this approach was applied due to a suboptimal use of predismissal discovery). 
 354  Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1198 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“Although the majority 
opinion purports to address the six plus factors as a whole, it actually focuses on each factor 
individually.”). Indeed, the district court dismissed the claim while admitting that “the consolidated 
complaint’s claims are not, taken as a whole, implausible.” In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., Musical 
Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., No. 2121, 2011 WL 3702453, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011). 
 355 See, e.g., In re Zinc Antitrust Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 337, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 356 In re Med. X–Ray Film Antitrust Litig., 946 F. Supp. 209, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Page, supra note 
77, at 417 (noting that plus factors can be “a constellation of pieces of evidence that, taken as a whole, 
create the necessary inference” of concerted action). 
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from which a reasonable jury could infer an agreement among the defendants 
to restrain competition. Looking at each plus factor in isolation—as these 
courts have done—is completely at odds with the Supreme Court’s mandate 
that antitrust plaintiffs’ evidence should be considered as whole and not “on 
its own,” “without more,” or “standing alone.”357 
D. The Consequences of Compartmentalizing Plus Factors 
The failure of federal courts to consider plus factors holistically is not 
a mere abstract mistake. This mistake has real consequences for markets and 
for consumers. When judges improperly isolate plus factors, it leads them to 
grant summary judgment on price-fixing claims even when illegal collusion 
has, in fact, occurred. Section IV.C described how the Ninth Circuit 
mistakenly isolated the plethora of plus factors that the plaintiffs presented 
showing how Cargill had participated in the citric acid price-fixing 
conspiracy, whose existence had already been proven through the guilty 
pleas of Cargill’s competitors (and coconspirators). Despite the fact that the 
plaintiffs had proffered evidence across every category of plus factor that 
Cargill had illegally conspired with its (already-convicted) rivals, the Ninth 
Circuit isolated every piece of evidence and then affirmed summary 
judgment, concluding that “there is no more than a scintilla of evidence that 
Cargill was a participant in the citric acid conspiracy.”358 This holding is 
wrong on its face given that the plaintiffs presented a surplus of plus factors 
well in excess of a scintilla. This holding might be less controversial if the 
court nonetheless reached the correct result, albeit using flawed analysis. But 
we know that both the court’s interpretation of the evidence and its outcome 
in the case were wrong. Although the court diminished the testimony of 
ADM employee Barrie Cox as not “direct evidence,” Cox informed the FBI, 
as part of his immunity deal, that he and his counterpart at Cargill had several 
explicit discussions in which the firms agreed to reduce output and mutually 
increase price of citric acid.359 Through these bilateral side meetings, Cargill 
belonged to the citric acid cartel and profited from the illegal collusion in 
proportionate measure to those manufacturers—Cargill’s coconspirators—
who had been criminally convicted. By prematurely granting summary 
judgment to Cargill, the Ninth Circuit prevented a jury from ever hearing 
Cox’s testimony—testimony that, when coupled with the abundance of plus 
factors, would have led any reasonable jury to find Cargill had participated 
in the citric acid price-fixing conspiracy. As a consequence of the Ninth 
Circuit’s improper cabining of evidence, Cargill escaped responsibility for 
 
 357 Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962). 
 358 In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 359 CONNOR, supra note 50, at 147–48. 
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its illegal conduct; it retained its ill-gotten gains from collusion, which 
undermines deterrence of price fixing. 
Not only does the compartmentalization of plus factors allow price 
fixers to evade antitrust liability, as Cargill did, it can deprive the victims of 
price fixing compensation for their injuries. Section IV.C explained how the 
Third Circuit in Valspar improperly isolated plus factors in granting 
summary judgment to the price-fixing defendants. The Valspar case, 
however, was but one of many antitrust lawsuits brought against the 
manufacturers of titanium dioxide. Antitrust lawyers had initiated class 
action litigation in Maryland district court. Valspar, which alone had 
purchased more than $1.2 billion of titanium dioxide during the period of the 
conspiracy, opted out of the class action and pursued its own lawsuit in 
Delaware district court.360 The Maryland judge did not compartmentalize 
plus factors and denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.361 
Facing the prospect of a trial during which the class counsel would present 
an overwhelming bundle of plus factors to the jury, the defendants agreed to 
pay $163.5 million to settle the case.362 In contrast, because the Delaware 
judge and the Third Circuit isolated plus factors, the titanium dioxide 
manufacturers evaded liability and did not have to pay any damages to one 
of their largest customers. The price fixers got to keep ill-gotten gains. This 
undermines deterrence. 
CONCLUSION 
When performing plus-factor analysis, courts too often disregard the 
Supreme Court’s mandate to examine plus factors holistically even if they 
pay lip service to that mandate. Antitrust opinions tend to discuss the plus 
factors proffered by an antitrust plaintiff one at a time in isolation and rarely 
do these opinions attempt to explain why each plus factor is probative of 
price fixing, let alone the relationships among the proffered plus factors. 
When judges find a plus factor insufficient in and of itself to establish an 
agreement, they incorrectly assert that the plus factor is, consequently, not a 
plus factor at all, without examining whether its interaction with other plus 
factors might support an inference of an agreement among competitors. 
This demonstrates a complete failure to appreciate how factor tests 
work. The whole point of a factor test is that no one factor is either necessary 
or sufficient. Each plus factor is probative, even if none on its own 
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constitutes proof of a conspiracy. The fact that dozens of courts have opined 
that a single plus factor does not on its own prove an agreement is troubling. 
By suggesting that a particular factor is not a plus factor if it does not prove 
an agreement on its own, courts show a fundamental lack of understanding 
of the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence. As a result, 
courts are too quick to dismiss price-fixing claims and to grant summary 
judgment when there is evidence of multiple plus factors that, when viewed 
together, permit a reasonable inference of collusion. 
Correcting these errors is necessary to restore antitrust law’s role in 
deterring and punishing price fixing. Moving forward, courts should 
consider how the proffered plus factors relate to each other. Plus factors are 
not simply additive; their probative value can increase exponentially when 
observed in combination with other plus factors. Each supplemental plus 
factor can increase the probative value of all of the preceding plus factors. 
Judges should analyze plus factors in relation to each other because the 
whole is often greater than the sum of its parts. 
